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Abstract 
The end of history was announced by Francis Fukuyama as a result of the fall of 
the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War. These happenings were seen as 
evidence of the victory of democracy and capitalism. Democracy has however not 
been as triumphant as expected and this is especially true for the developing 
countries. At the same time globalisation has become one of the major phenomena 
of our time. This study is set out to investigate the link between political 
globalisation and democratisation in the developing world. The purpose is to put 
focus on political globalisation on its own, not just as a part of globalisation or as 
a complementary factor to economic globalisation.  
The analytical framework is based upon the theory of Jeffrey Haynes, 
which states that political globalisation is affected by three sets of factors/actors; 
state actors, non-state actors and background factors. This study focuses on the 
state and non-state actors.  
The study is a quantitative study and the statistical material comes from the KOF 
Index of Globalisation and the Global Civil Society Yearbooks, the former is used 
for the state actor component, the latter for the non-state actor component of 
political globalisation. The years chosen are 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2002 and 
2003. 80 developing countries are included in the analysis, divided into three main 
categories. The statistical analysis is carried out according to the theory, from a 
state actor and a non-state actor perspective, which then are combined in a final 
part.  
The results show that there is no correlation between a country’s level of 
democratic development and level of political globalisation. It does, however, 
show that there is a correlation between the state and non-state actor components, 
which confirms the theory that they are interconnected.  
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If you are totally illiterate and living on one dollar a day, the benefits 
of globalization never come to you.   
 
- Jimmy Carter 
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1 Introduction 
The end of history. That was what Francis Fukuyama envisioned with the fall of 
the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War. It was the end because liberal 
democracy and the capitalist system had prevailed. The evolution of state systems 
had finally come to a point where it could go no further. But Fukuyama was 
wrong. While the capitalist system, in principal, is universally applied, democracy 
is not. This is especially true in the developing world. 
Democracy has not been as triumphant as expected and twenty years on, from 
Fukuyama’s somewhat impetuous presumption, we know that there are plenty of 
non-democratic countries in the world. However, although the worldwide spread 
of democracy has failed to appear, much has changed during these past two 
decades. It is generally argued that we live in a globalised, or at least in a 
globalising, world, and that this phenomenon of globalisation permeates many 
aspects of our lives. Consequently, it also affects us in various ways starting from 
a personal level all the way to state level. 
These two concepts, but also the real phenomena; democracy and 
globalisation, are today important parts of our world. Democracy has at least won 
a conceptual victory; it is thought of as the best way to govern a state.1 Even states 
that are not considered democratic call themselves democracies. While democracy 
is preached across the globe, we simultaneously have the process of globalisation 
and it is indeed interesting to study how these two may or may not affect each 
other. It was not long ago the established view was that democratisation was 
domestically driven, and external factors had little to do with it. While this has 
changed, globalisation tends to be viewed mainly as an economic phenomenon, 
with the political aspect left behind. This thesis is set out to concentrate on that 
which has seldom been in focus when it comes to democratisation and 
globalisation; the linkage between political globalisation and democratisation. The 
intention is to find out if globalisation in the developing world might have an 
effect on democratisation, not from an economic, but from a political perspective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Johansson Jonas in Engström, Ole – Hydén, Göran (ed.), 2002. Development and Democracy. What we 
have learned and how?, p.24, London: Routledge 
Chatterjee, Deen K (ed.), 2008. Democracy in a global world. p.1, Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers 
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2 Purpose and Questions  
A lot is already known about domestic factors in developing countries and how 
they may or may not affect democratisation. For a long time the debates about 
democratisation revolved around the internal state of the countries and external 
factors were neglected. However, with the increased awareness of the forces of 
globalisation questions about the impact of globalisation on democratisation have 
arisen, at the same time as the term ‘external actors’ has undergone a significant 
change. It was once used only to refer to states but is now a term for a variety of 
state and non-state actors. It is also understood that the flows of external 
influences are diffuse and numerous and democratisation can happen in many 
different ways.2 Together these changes have contributed to new ways of looking 
at democratisation but it still remains unclear how globalisation affects it. 
Although there are some studies that have tried to investigate the linkage they 
have been focused on globalisation at large, including economic and political 
globalisation and occasionally also cultural globalisation. In this study 
globalisation is narrowed down to just one of its components, political 
globalisation, in order to study the particular impact of political globalisation on 
democratisation. In doing so, it will be possible to find out if political 
globalisation has an important part in democratisation or if it is the other 
components of globalisation that are of greater interest in trying to determine the 
linkage between globalisation and democratisation.  
The purpose of this thesis is to put focus on the political aspect of 
globalisation and its impact on democratisation. The political aspect is often, if 
not neglected, at least seen as secondary, to economic globalisation, which is 
presented as an obvious important factor whereas the political is placed in the 
background or as a complementary factor. The same was true for external factors 
for a very long time until, quite recently, it was realised that the external could be 
just as important as the internal. There is no way to know just how important, or 
unimportant for that matter, the political aspect of globalisation is until it has been 
studied on its own, not just lumped together with economic globalisation. Until 
then, one cannot reduce political globalisation to a negligible or insignificant 
factor. 
This purpose gives rise to the following question: 
 
●Can a correlation between political globalisation and democratisation in 
developing countries be observed; if yes, what does this correlation show? 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Grugel, Jean (ed.) 1999. Democracy without borders. Transnationalization and conditionality in new 
democracies. p.19-20,159-160 London: Routledge 
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2.1 Thesis Outline 
The thesis will begin with three sections that all are theoretical linked together. 
The key concepts will be defined in section 3, where the emphasis is on the key 
concepts themselves and literature related to them. Section 4 will present previous 
studies of importance for the study. Here the emphasis is on the literature in large, 
selected from different fields of study, all with significance for this study, whether 
it is the outcome, method contributions or interesting observations. Section 5 will 
present the analytical frame work, which is entirely focused on the theory that will 
make up the foundation for the quantitative study. This section is followed by an 
extensive section 6 on methods and materials. Its length is motivated by the fact 
that much of the background on material is necessary since the statistical analysis 
itself will be carried out in databases, not available to the readers. Section 7 is the 
part where the result and analysis is presented, which is followed by section 8, the 
conclusion and final note.  
2.2 Delimitations 
Because globalisation and democratisation both are such big topics they must by 
necessity be delimited. This study does not deal with development in developing 
countries, merely how political globalisation can affect, or in fact, does affect 
democratisation in these countries. Although democracy is thought to have 
positive effects on development that is a whole other study. Whether the outcome 
of this study shows that globalisation promotes democracy or that it has a negative 
impact on democratisation, it would be of interest to further investigate the linkage 
between democratisation, globalisation and development. However, this is 
something that cannot be done here. It is very important to keep in mind that this 
thesis is only focusing on political globalisation and does not make any claims 
that political globalisation is the same as globalisation as a whole. It is not 
concerned with economic nor cultural globalisation for that would demand a much 
different approach to the topic. 
Another delimitation that has been necessary is that domestic factors are not in 
the centre of attention. This does not mean that they are seen as irrelevant or only 
dependent on external factors. However, the aim is not to account for the 
processes within the countries where globalisation is affecting democratisation but 
to see if the external factors and actors in fact have effects on the democratic 
development. It is important to remember that also a result that shows that there is 
no connection is of interest. Another delimitation that has been made is that 
background factors have been excluded from the analysis. This is partly because 
the theory itself perceives the background factors as secondary but also because 
background factors such a global or regional economic depression (which is 
argued to have a negative impact on democratisation) would either have a similar 
  9 
effect on the developing world (in case of global economic depression) which 
would mean that it would not show in the analysis or it would have a pronounced 
effect on one area (in case of regional economic depression) in which case it 
would be visible in the statistical material anyway without actually including 
background factors. In addition, background factors can not be included in a 
statistical comparison like this one, since it demands thorough studies of regional 
and global happenings that are not relevant for the study of the impact of political 
globalisation on democratisation in developing countries. 
More practical delimitations that have been necessary are the exclusion of 
some countries. Already from the start, 14 micro-island-states where excluded. 
After confirming material available on the countries in the KOF Index of 
globalisation another nine countries had to be removed from the studied. The 
Global Civil Society Yearbooks included all countries remaining in the study. 
This means that there are in total 80 countries in the study.  
  10 
3 Key Concepts Defined 
None of the key concepts in this study are easily defined. In fact, they are 
constantly defined and redefined, contested and discussed. Defining key concepts 
are always important, but it is crucial when dealing with notions that do not have a 
fixed meaning and can be understood differently from person to person. The 
following definitions are not in any way superior to other or are the ones to hold 
the true meaning of the concept. This is merely and elaboration of how they are 
understood in this study. 
3.1 Globalisation 
Globalisation as a concept is used quite arbitrary to denote most everything and 
anything. It is a word in fashion which makes it difficult to pin down. The 
definitions vary a lot depending on the where the focus lies. Globalisation 
incorporates a variety of different processes which indeed are not easy to separate 
from one another. Studies concerned with economic globalisation are more likely 
to define globalisation in economic terms, while researchers focusing on cultural 
globalisation perceive the concept in other terms. It is thus often necessary to 
define globalisation from the perspective of the study. Globalisation in this thesis 
is narrowed down to political globalisation and it is the definition of political 
globalisation that is of greater importance. It is however useful to have a more 
general definition of globalisation as a starting point. A good first definition of 
globalisation is made by Feketekuty who defines it as 
 
[…] a phenomenon involving the integration of economies, cultures, 
governmental policies and political movements around the world.3 
 
Moreover, many also feel the need to make a distinction between a globalising 
world as oppose to a globalised world. The latter is rather an outcome of the 
former, which is a process, whereas globalised, indicates the end of such a 
process.4 Globalisation in this thesis will be understood as a process and not as a 
fixed occurrence. It is also important to separate the definitions of globalisation 
from definitions of globalisation outcomes, as many definitions tend to point to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 Feketekuty, Geza. 2007. Globalization – Why all the fuss?  
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1518186/Globalization-Why-All-the-Fuss  
4 Dicken, Peter, 2007. Global shift. Mapping the changing contours of the world economy. p.8, London: 
SAGE Publications 
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the outcomes of globalisation rather than globalisation itself. This is the case with 
the definition from the organisation Global Policy Forum that states that 
 
Globalization creates new markets and wealth, even as it causes widespread 
suffering, disorder and unrest. It is both a source of repression and a catalyst 
for global movement of social justice and emancipation.5 
 
Although the definition is far from irrelevant for this thesis, it is in fact irrelevant 
as a definition of globalisation because it does not explain what the processes are, 
merely their outcomes. This could be one reason why globalisation is such a 
difficult notion to define; it is a process and an outcome at the same time. 
However, it is not possible to understand the outcomes if we do not understand 
the processes and the processes are complicated as it is, without involving the 
outcomes. Jessop concludes 
 
Globalisation is a […] supercomplex series of multicentric, multiscalar, 
multitemporal, multiform and multicausal processes.6 
 
It is, in other words, a very intricate work to try to define globalisation and this is 
why the focus will be on the definition of political globalisation. This definition is 
more relevant for the thesis than the definition of globalisation, since it will 
exclude economic and cultural processes which both are a part of globalisation as 
a whole, but not the process of political globalisation. 
3.2 Political Globalisation 
Political globalisation is understood partly as what Mittelman designate as an 
“emerging worldwide preference for democracy”7 That might, however, be at the 
same time, a too wide and too narrow definition, although it could be seen, at 
least, as a starting point. Axel Dreher, responsible for the KOF Index of 
Globalisation states that political globalisation is characterised by a diffusion of 
government policies whereas Global Policy Forum asserts that political activity 
increasingly takes place at a global level.8 
Their definition of political globalisation is as follows 
 
Under globalization, politics take place above the state through political 
integration schemes such as the European Union and through 
intergovernmental organizations such as International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Political activity can also 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Global Policy Forum: www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/index/htm  
6 Jessop in Dicken  (2007) p.8 
7 Mittelman quoted in Haynes Jeffrey in McGrew Anthony – Poku Nana K. (ed.), 2007. Globalization, 
development and human security. p.87, Cambridge: Polity Press  
8 Dreher Axel, 2006. “Does globalisation affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalisation”, 
Applied Economics, vol.38 nr.10:1091-1110, from http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/cite/ p.4 
Global Policy Forum: www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/index.htm  
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transcend national borders through global movements and NGOs. Civil 
society organizations act globally by forming alliances with organizations in 
other countries, using global communications systems, and lobbying 
international organizations and other actors directly, instead of working 
through their national governments.9 
 
The fact that this definition includes organisations that first and foremost are 
economic organisations point to something important when it comes to political 
globalisation; where political globalisation ends and economic globalisation starts 
is not always a clear-cut situation. Nonetheless, these organisations are indeed 
political organisations as well as economic organisations and they take on the 
form of intergovernmental organisations, pursuing more than purely economic 
aims, which is why they also are a part of political globalisation. In reality there is 
no easy way to completely separate economic and political globalisation, but in 
general, economic globalisation is more concerned with variables such as 
economic flows, foreign direct investments, spread of financial markets and 
spatial reorganisation of production, than with intergovernmental organisations.10 
It is thus not unreasonable to view organisations such as the World Bank and the 
IMF as a part of political globalisation, perhaps more so than as a part of 
economic globalisation.    
It is the definition by Global Policy Forum combined with the understanding 
that democracy is considered and promoted as the best regime in the world that 
will be used in the study to denote political globalisation. The ideational victory of 
democracy and the real increase in intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and 
cross-border civil society are thus what constitute political globalisation. Unlike 
the vague definitions by Dreher and Mittelman, it is an elaborate definition that 
includes both intergovernmental organisations (which would incorporate Dreher’s 
definition of diffusion of government policies) and nongovernmental 
organisations, both state actors and non-state actors. This is important for the 
study as the theoretical framework (see below) points to the importance of both 
state and non-state actors for political globalisation. 
3.3 Democracy and Democratisation 
In a very simplistic way one could conclude that democratisation is the process 
and democracy the end of the process. While this certainly is true, it does not tell 
us what these two concepts stand for. This study focuses on democratisation; 
however, it is also important to know how its end result – democracy – is 
understood. Democratisation is a less intricate concept because, unlike democracy 
which describes a condition, democratisation is the process. This makes the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 Global Policy Forum: www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/index.htm  
10 http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch 
Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.86 
Johansson in Elgström and Hydén (2002) p.36 
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concept less contentious. At the very basis, it is used only to describe the 
transition from an authoritarian rule toward a more democratic one and the 
development of the institutions necessary for such a democratic regime.11  It does 
not necessarily go into what the process would or should lead to. Since the 
process of democratisation will be understood as the implementations of settings 
and institutions necessary for democracy it is democracy that needs to be defined. 
The definition of democratisation is thus partly dependent on the definition of 
democracy. In other words, if democracy is only understood as universal suffrage, 
the introduction of such would indicate a democratisation. Although it would still 
remain an indicator of democratisation in a more complex definition of 
democracy, it is certainly not enough. In the former case the introduction of 
election processes would suggest not only that democratisation takes place but 
also that the end result, democracy, has been reached. In the latter case, 
democratisation is an ongoing, but not finished process. Because of this the focus 
in this part will be on democracy and what the concept means in this study. 
Trying to define democracy is difficult but as a starting point one could argue 
that it is only a term used to refer to ‘rule by the people’, but the debate about 
democracy goes back to ancient Greece and the meaning of the word has indeed 
evolved and transformed with time.12 The concept of democracy can be 
understood minimally as in the case with Jeffrey Haynes who concludes that 
democracy 
 
[…] involves the holding of relatively free and fair elections, following which 
a victorious party or parties take power.13 
 
Democracy is here defined as the right to vote in political elections and that these 
will determine who runs the country. However, this definition is problematic in 
various ways. As countries in order to gain international democratic legitimacy 
may hold elections only with the aim to prove its democratic rule, democracy 
becomes limited to the process of elections alone, which means that democracy 
remains superficial. In many cases democracy is only rhetorically achieved. Larry 
Diamond calls these “hollow democracies”. They are democracies with political 
violence, human right violations, corruption and judicial inefficiency, to mention 
a few characteristics.14 It is thus very dangerous to equal democracy with 
elections because it does not tell us anything about civil rights and only very little 
about political rights. This is why the minimal definition of democracy will not be 
used in this study. 
Robert Pinkney argues that democracy as a concept is very elusive, something 
many with him would agree on. Lise Storm concludes 
 
Liberal democracy, delegative democracy, industrial democracy, western 
democracy, Islamic democracy, semi-democracy, façade democracy, and so 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 Sørensen, Georg, 1993. Democracy and democratizatio. p.14, Oxford: Westview Press 
12 Sørensen (1993) p.3-9 
13 Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.83 
14 Diamond, Larry, 1999. Developing democracy. Toward consolidation. p.49, 65, Baltimore: The Johns   
Hopkins University Press 
Haynes in McGrew and Poku (2007) p.88 
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the list goes on. […] With hundreds of different definitions of democracy in 
use today, it has become almost impossible to gauge what is meant by the 
term[…]15 
 
Pinkney makes an attempt to present a few of these democratic concepts, based on 
the studies by Dodd and Sklar, ranging from radical democracy and liberal 
democracy to socialist democracy and consociational democracy. Pinkney does 
however fail to define democracy on its own and what he does is solely a 
comparison between the different concepts. It thus remains unclear what 
democracy compared to non-democracy stands for.16 
Overall, there seems to be an unwillingness to define what democracy means. 
Whether this depends on the complexity of the term or something else remains 
unsaid. However, someone who has created an elaborate definition of democracy 
is Robert Dahl and it is his definition that will be used here. Dahl’s approach to 
democracy is quite different from that of Haynes. Although he too states 
conditions for what is minimally necessary for a country to be called democratic, 
these conditions are much more extensive. 
Firstly, Robert Dahl makes a difference between democracy and what he calls 
polyarchy. Polyarchy is, in fact, a term to describe democratic countries. 
However, Dahl has chosen not to call these democracies but polyarchies, in order 
to make a distinction between, the existing democratic states and what democracy 
means in theory. He argues that there has never been a perfect democracy, where 
all its citizens have had, more or less, the same political resources and where the 
government is completely responsible to all citizens. This discrepancy between 
democracy in theory and in practice is thus marked by Dahl by the usage of the 
word polyarchy instead of democracy.17 
 
In his book Democracy and its critics Dahl establishes seven different institutions 
necessary for a country to be considered a democracy.18 The author concludes 
 
[…]polyarchy is a political order distinguished by the presence of seven 
institutions, all of which must exist for a government to be classified as a 
polyarchy.19 
 
The first of the seven institutions is elected officials, which means that the people 
have control over government decisions about policy by electing their officials. 
These officials should be elected in recurring free and fair elections. The third 
institution is inclusive suffrage, meaning that practically all adults have the right 
to vote in the election. As an extension of this right, the fourth institution, right to 
run to office, gives the right to all adults to run for elective offices in the 
government. However, the age limit might be higher than for the suffrage. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
15 Storm, Lise, 2008. “An elemental definition of democracy and its advantages for comparing 
political regime types”. p.215, Democratization, vol.15, no.2 
16 Pinkney, Robert, 1993. Democracy in the third world. p.5-7, Buckingham: Open University Press 
17 Diamond (1999) p.18 
18 Dahl, Robert A, 1989. Democracy and its critics. p.221, New Haven: Yale University Press 
19 Dahl (1989) p.221 [emphasis added] 
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last three institutions are linked to the civil society; freedom of expression is the 
fifth institution necessary for a democracy and simply means that citizens have the 
right to express themselves, including criticising the government, the regime, the 
officials, the socioeconomic order and the prevailing ideology, without danger of 
punishment; alternative information means that the citizens must have the right to 
seek out alternative sources of information and that these should exist in the first 
place and be protected by law. Finally, the seventh institution should ensure 
associational autonomy, so that citizens have the right to form independent 
associations or organisation, including political parties.20 
These seven institutions are thus the preconditions for democracy according to 
Dahl. The reason why this definition has been chosen is not only the fact that it 
includes both political and civil rights but also because this definition corresponds 
to the operationalisation of the concept (see Method and Materials). As a result, 
democratisation in this study is defined as the process in which these institutions 
are introduced and established. 
3.4 Developing Countries 
Many would argue that it is not fruitful to lump all countries into one single 
definition since the variations among the developing countries themselves are 
very high. However, they do all exhibit some very similar characteristics, which 
makes it possible to speak of developing countries. These characteristics do not 
only consist of material indicators such as low per capita income, but also low 
levels of literacy, low life expectancy, low enrolment rates in school, and high 
infant mortality. In addition, the countries have often been under colonial rule as 
well.21 
Through the years there have been many different terms to denote the same 
thing; the Third World, underdeveloped countries, emergent countries and 
developing countries to mention a few. Even though they stand for the same thing 
some terms are more problematic then other. The term Third World is a remnant 
of the Cold War and was originally used to refer to poor countries whose political 
system had not been transformed by membership of the communist bloc.22 The 
term underdeveloped does not only indicate a static condition but also that the 
countries are inferior to other, developed, countries. For this study the term 
developing countries will be applied. One of the reasons is that the concept 
suggests an ongoing process, they are developing. They are not locked in a fixed 
state of development issues. Even though developing countries might not be a 
great term to denote what it is all about it remains one of the best. The developing 
countries in this study will be selected partly on economic grounds, partly on 
social grounds (see Method and Materials) which means that purely economic or 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
20 Dahl (1989) p.221 
21 Pinkney (1993) p.2 
22 ibid. p.1 
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social definitions of developing countries are avoided. In the end, notions like ‘the 
Third World’, ‘underdeveloped countries’ and ‘developing countries’ are often 
used interchangeably, referring to the same thing. With a lack of other, better 
terms these are the ones at hand. Choosing a definition for developing countries is 
thus more about choosing the terms than choosing the meaning of it. 
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4 Previous Studies 
There is an array of literature on democratisation, developing countries and 
globalisation as well as various combinations of these, although the one on 
globalisation is yet to be as voluminous as the other two. It is thus not easy to 
know where to start when the supply of literature is more than enough for a thesis 
on its own. This part will present a number of previous studies, mainly the ones 
that are the most prominent within the field and for the study. Certainly, it does 
not provide a full overview of the literature available. It is merely a way to place 
this thesis within the research already carried out.  
Starting with the literature on democracy, a quantitative study that deserves to 
be mentioned is Democracy and development by Axel Hadenius. The study goes 
back to 1988 which makes it slightly outdated. It is, however, interesting to note 
how the level of democracy in developing countries was almost exclusively 
explained by domestic factors. Hadenius uses a number of theories as a starting 
point and after creating an index of democracy of his own, the theories and index 
are applied to 132 countries in order to explain and evaluate the level of 
democracy in developing countries.23 Hadenius divides the theories into three 
categories; socioeconomic, demographic and cultural, and institutional and the 
index is used for empirical examination of the theories. An interesting conclusion 
is that differences in socio-economic development in developing countries are not 
inconsiderable but “far from crucial for democracy”.24  That would mean that the 
level of democracy is not dependent on the level of development to any greater 
extent, which would also indicate that democratisation is not merely a result of 
increased development. This is a very important point as socio-economic 
development often is portrayed as the most central domestic factor for 
democratisation.  
 After looking into the following as possible explanations of level of 
democracy: economic development (GNP/capita, degree of industrialisation and 
urbanisation), social development (literacy, infant mortality, calorie consumption 
and school enrolment), trade dependency, distribution of income and poverty, 
fragmentation (ethnic, linguistic and religious), religion, country size, colonial 
background (including duration of colonial period), size of the public sector and 
the role of military, Hadenius concludes that the variables that proved to be 
significant could only explain about 60 percent of the variation of level of 
democracy.25 Assuming that the study does reflect the reality correctly, this would 
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indicate there are many other variables at play than those investigated. One 
possibility is that these could be constituted by external factors and are to be 
found in an international context.  In other words in 1988, domestic factors could 
only account for a little more than half of the variation. This could mean that 1) 
external factors may have an almost equal importance and 2) the importance of 
external factors is likely higher now than twenty years ago. This is an important 
observation as this study concentrates on the external factors of democratisation.    
Tatu Vanhanen’s Prospects of democracy. A study of 172 countries is another 
quantitative study. Vanhanen states that he agrees with those who assume that 
there are many different factors that affect the chances of establishing and 
maintaining democracy. He does, however, believe that there is one common 
underlying factor in the process of democratisation. Vanhanen, inspired by 
Darwinian theories, calls it “an evolutionary theory of democratisation”.26 
Because human nature is similar in all parts of the world, Vanhanen believes it is 
reasonable to expect that similar factors have been related to the emergence and 
failures of democracy everywhere in the world. Vanhanen’s hypothesis is that the 
distribution of power relations is crucial and in order to test this, he constructs 
both an index of democratisation and an index of power resources. The level of 
democracy is then compared to the degree of resource distribution.27 Vanhanen 
concludes that there is indeed one regular and dominant casual factor; the relative 
distribution of power resources. About 60-65 percent of the variation in the degree 
of democracy can be explained by the degree of resource distribution and 
according to himself, his theory is superior to theories of democratisation that 
concentrate on economic development or physical quality of life. Vanhanen can, 
unlike those theories, explain why some wealthy countries have remained non-
democratic, while other poor countries are democracies. It is all in the distribution 
of power resources. Like Hadenius, he believes that democracy is not something 
that is limited to only wealthier, more developed countries.28  
The main reason why this study is of interest is the focus on distribution of 
power resources and how changes in this distribution could influence the 
possibilities of democracy. When taking international nongovernmental 
organisations and other external non-state actors into account combined with the 
time and space compression which follows a more globalised world, one could 
argue that the distribution of power resources is not only limited to a domestic 
sphere. The possibility to affect and influence could go beyond borders. This is, 
however, something Vanhanen overlooks.  
When discussing democracy and democratisation it is inevitable to mention 
Samuel Huntington and his The Third Wave. Democratization in the late twentieth 
century. His starting point is that democratisation has happened in three waves 
and the title, the third wave, refers to the wave of democratisation that begun in 
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1974. In his theory on waves of democratisation, the first two waves were also 
followed by reverse ways, which again reduced the number of democracies.29  
The first wave of democratisation that begun in 1828 lasted until 1926. During 
this period, Huntington argues that the USA and New Zealand was democratised 
along with the majority of the European countries. A few countries in Latin 
America were also affected. However, in Asia, only Japan was democratised and 
Africa remained unaffected by this first wave of democratisation.30  
The first reverse wave started with the fascist rule in Italy, the communist rule 
in Soviet and the Nazi rule in Germany. It lasted between 1922 and 1942. With 
the second wave of democratisation (1943-1963) a second reverse wave followed. 
Before that, West Germany, Turkey and Brazil had been democratised, as well as 
Lebanon and Israel in the Middle East and Nigeria in Africa. However, a new 
trend of authoritarian regimes replaced the wave of democratisation in the end of 
the 1950s. Military rule dominated South America and Asia and in Africa, all 
independent countries but Botswana turned into authoritarian regimes. 31 The last 
wave of democratisation then started in 1974, and this is the focus of the book.  
During the following 15 years democratic regimes replaced authoritarian in thirty 
countries, and in countries where democratisation did not take place there was still 
some liberalisation. Huntington calls this wave a global wave of 
democratisation.32  
Huntington asks himself why these particular countries and not others were 
democratised in this time period. He concludes that previous experience of 
democracy is favourable, even if failed at the time, but overall no single factor is 
sufficient in explaining the development of democracy, nor is anyone in particular 
necessary for democratisation.33  
In Consolidating the third wave democracies Yu-han Chu, Fu Hu and Chung-
in Moon discuss the international context in which all countries are democratised 
and their starting point is where Huntington left his study. They argue that the 
analysis of external influences is an indispensable part of democratisation studies 
and that it is not reasonable to always view external factors as secondary or of 
subordinated importance.34 The most recent transitions to democracy have 
benefited from a supportive global economic and ideological environment, which, 
according to the authors, did not exist in the first and second wave of 
democratisation. Like many others they argue that democracy has triumphed as 
“the predominant mode of legitimisation in the international ideological 
community”.35 
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Their study focuses on South Korea and Taiwan and although it is very specific 
they make some interesting points relevant for this study that are worth 
mentioning. They assert that various transnational actors have played an important 
role assisting the democratic opening of both South Korea and Taiwan. 
Democratic forces in South Korea formed diverse transnational networks with 
international nongovernmental organisations and the church-related groups were 
the most active. This is also true in Taiwan where material support was given to 
political dissidents by religious groups.36 This is an interesting observation and it 
points to something very important; it is not only the organisations with 
pronounced democracy promoting aims that are working for democratisation. In 
other words, a study that focus on non-state actors and democratisation are very 
limited if it only studies the impact of democracy promoting nongovernmental 
organisations and actors, since it disregards the fact that other sorts of NGOs may 
have, and in the case of Taiwan and South Korea in fact did have, an effect on 
democratisation.  
The supply of literature dealing with globalisation and more specifically 
political globalisation linked with developing countries is, if not scarce, certainly 
not as frequent as the studies on developing countries and democratisation. When 
dealing with developing countries and globalisation it is often economic 
globalisation that is in focus. It is remarkable to note how much emphasise is put 
on globalisation understood as economic globalisation but very little on political 
globalisation and its impact on democratisation. 
Jan Aart Scholte makes some interesting points in the chapter Globalization 
and (Un)Democracy in his book Globalization. Although Scholte first and 
foremost are concerned with the democratisation of globalisation, that is, how to 
make the processes of globalisation more democratic, he occasionally also focus 
on the possibility of globalisation to promote democratisation. When it comes to 
political globalisation he concludes that various connections can be drawn 
between global relations and the spread of democracy since the 1980s. He argues 
that human rights campaigns and other transnational civil society associations 
were involved in pushing for the end of authoritarian regimes, in Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America.37 There is thus, at least to a certain 
extent, empirical evidence that civil society organisations can make a difference 
for democracy.  
In addition, Scholte points to the fact that many suprastate agencies have 
supplied different forms of democracy support, anything from EU programmes, 
UN election monitoring, to ‘good governance’38 promotion by international 
financial institutions.39 On the other hand, Scholte remains cautious when it 
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comes to the direct impact of globalisation on democracy. He argues that although 
globalisation has been a force behind the contemporary wave of democratisation, 
it has certainly not been the sole influence. Instead it is more likely that global 
forces have only furthered democratisation where the country from the start has 
been receptive of these forces.40    
Jonas Johansson has studied the correlation between globalisation and 
democratisation. His focus is on both political and economic globalisation, which 
are brought together in an index. In Globalisation and democracy – an overlooked 
connection Johansson aims at finding out if globalisation makes a systematic 
difference, and if so, whether it promotes or hinders democracy. However, he 
points out that the countries studied should not be countries that are already 
mature democracies. In other words, there is no purpose in studying countries that 
are consolidated democracies as he assumes that globalisation is not a force that 
can change the political situation in already solid democratic countries.41  
Using Freedom House as a source Johansson concludes that “democratisation 
of domestic politics worldwide is a globalisation process in itself.”42 
An index of globalisation is constructed based on five indicators; the number of 
intergovernmental organisations to which a country belongs; the number of 
international conventions ratified by a country; number of nongovernmental 
organisations; share of trade in a country’s economy and finally; the level of 
inflow of foreign direct investment.43   
With the constructed globalisation index Johansson analyses 124 countries. 
The findings show that the degree of globalisation has an “unambiguous 
significance for the degree of democracy.”44 This is however only true for 
countries at a relatively high level of socio-economic development (high HDI 
ranking). The second conclusion is that the degree of globalisation and 
development are interacting and strengthen their effects on democracy. This 
means that high level of globalisation combined with high level of development 
often occurs in countries with high level of democracy.45 The casual links, 
however, remain unclear. The weakness with the study is that it does not 
acknowledge that political globalisation and economic globalisation require quite 
different preconditions. While economic globalisation often demands openness, 
high level of transparency, low level of corruption, protected ownership rights and 
so forth (which often comes with higher level of democracy and socio-economic 
development), political globalisation does not. Civil society organisations are on 
the contrary often more active in countries with greater problems, and the level of 
development does not dictate the possibility of political activity on a global level 
unlike global economic activity, which indeed is closely linked to development 
level. As a final note, an interesting remark made by Johansson is that the 
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numerical increase and geographical spread of liberal democratic norms can be 
seen as a global process of diffusion. In other words, the diffusion of democracy 
can be seen as a part of (political) globalisation.46 This brings us to the literature 
on democratic diffusion47 or democracy promotion, which in itself is a large field 
of study, which is why only one study will be presented here. 
Democracy from the outside-in? by Daniel Silander focuses on democracy 
promotion and democratisation in postcommunist Europe, where democracy 
promotion is understood as “an active prodemocratic pressure towards domestic 
actors”.48 The starting point is that there are actors that may promote the 
democracy norm and that these may use different methods and channel towards 
domestic actors which may create relations and have an impact on domestic 
actors.49 Silander distinguishes four different actors; the global actor, which is 
focused on global issues. Examples given are the UN and the World Bank; the 
international actor which refers to the interaction of states beyond borders. These 
are often regionally rooted, like EU and NATO; the state actor which simply 
refers to the state and finally; the sub-state actor which in this case refers to the 
transnational actor that operates cross borders and consists of anything from 
movements and companies to local authorities. According to Silander this link 
could be called a global society-to-society relation.50 Three methods for 
democracy promotion are then presented; political, economic and military 
methods, followed by the channels which refers to the way in which democracy 
promotion is channelled into the target state, either top-down or bottom-up or 
possibly both. The top-down channel is used when democracy promotion is 
directed toward the regime with its institutions and political elite. This is the 
prevalent approach for international democracy promotion. However, there could 
also be a simultaneous bottom-up democracy promotion taking place or if the top-
down approach fails this could be an alternative solution. The bottom-up channel 
is democracy promotion directed towards the society and the population, that is, 
the civil society.51 Democratisation from the below involves targeting 
organisations and movements to become prodemocratic. Silander concludes 
 
If there is space for societal activities beyond state control and regulation that 
are prodemocratic in nature, democracy promotion through bottom-up may 
very well lead to democratization.52    
 
This thesis includes both the top-down and the bottom-up channels, which in the 
analytical framework are called state and non-state actors.   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
46 Johansson in Elgström and Hydén (2002) p.29 
47 Democracy diffusion is used when referring to the spontaneous spread of democratic ideas, whereas 
democracy promotion refers to active prodemocratic pressure, thus not spontaneous. See Silander (2005) 
p.83, 192 
48 Silander, Daniel, 2005. Democracy from the outside-in? The conceptualisation and significance of 
democracy promotion. p.83, Gothenburg: Intellecta Docusys 
49 Silander (2005) p.89 
50 ibid. p.90 
51 ibid. p.95-99 
52 ibid. p.99 
  23 
Finally, it is concluded that there is a domestic dominance in the traditional 
research on democratisation and international factors are often neglected. The 
results show that a successful democracy promotion is likely based on a firm 
interest in democratisation as well as the use of both top-down and bottom-up 
channels. Democracy promotion is less likely to be successful when the interest is 
limited and when the promotion process is hindered by the regime, leaving the 
democracy promotion to a bottom-up approach.53 There is in other words 
empirical evidence to support the idea that democracy promotion is the most 
efficient when it is encourage by both state-actors and non-state actors, working 
from two different levels. 
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5 Analytical Framework 
According to Jeffrey Haynes the views on globalisation can roughly be divided 
into two perspectives; globalisation seen as a disperser of democratic values and 
institutions and; globalisation as a phenomenon that is obstructing or limiting 
substantive democracy. As a result, depending on the perspective, theories differ 
considerably in their approach to globalisation and its effects on democracy. As it 
is the aim of this study to investigate what effects political globalisation might 
have on democratisation it is not useful to apply a theory that already from the 
start has chosen side. What is needed is rather a theory that states how 
globalisation can have importance for democratisation without providing a 
normative standpoint of its effects. 
Haynes starting point is that every developing country and its domestic 
political arrangements are affected by globalisation, though the degree and precise 
impact naturally varies from country to country. He also states that one needs to 
take into account a range of domestic and external factors when trying to explain 
democratisation and democracy in developing countries54 According to Chatterjee 
the impact of globalisation on democracy has been especially pronounced and that 
there has been a worldwide trend toward democratisation in the past few decades. 
He further argues that the democratic recognition of broader human needs has 
taken a global dimension and there has been a surge of pluralistically oriented 
social and political movements in democratic countries as well as non-democratic. 
This, he assert, is a result of globalisation.55 He then concludes 
 
Though these two global and domestic trends manifest differently, they share 
the common democratic ideals of autonomy, equality and political 
participation, as well as the spur of globalization.56 
 
Returning to Haynes, he states that the recent impact of political globalisation on 
domestic politics in developing countries is bolstered by three key developments. 
The first is linked to the collapse of European communist governments which 
gave rise to an increase in both democracy and human rights concerns in the 
developed world as well as democratic demands from people in developing 
countries living under authoritarian regimes. Soon enough the pressure to 
democratise was not only domestic but also international and it has continued to 
increase. The 1990s also saw the birth of many new states. Haynes argues that 
under such circumstances it seems plausible that “both international and 
transnational actors might have a significant impact on the political arrangements 
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of theses new states.” This is because many have not completed the formation of 
the political system. Haynes concludes that countries, which he defines as, small, 
weak and vulnerable, are especially open to external influences.57  However, as 
mentioned above all developing countries are affected, not only the instable and 
small ones. 
 
[…] political arrangements in virtually all developing countries, almost 
regardless of their age, size, geographical position, type of political system or 
level of economic development, are influenced – to some degree – by what 
international and transnational actors do.58 
 
At the same time he is careful not to overemphasise the importance of political 
globalisation, because he also asserts that few if any developing country has had 
their domestic political arrangements dictated for a long time.59 The question that 
arises is how exactly external actors influence domestic political outcomes in 
developing countries. 
The second key development is described as pressure to democratise from 
transnational civil society, which refers to the involvement or encouragement 
from human rights-oriented transnational civil society groups and democracy-
promotion organisations for authoritarian governments to reform, mainly through 
adoption and implementation of international democratic and human rights 
norms.60 
Finally, the third key development is the increased international economic 
integration. Haynes argument is that the increased international economic 
integration has led to socio-political consequences which have resulted in growing 
demands in developing countries for democracy. The international economic 
competition increased with globalisation and as an effect many countries with a 
weak economic position found themselves worse off. Production systems and 
labour markets changed and there was a weakening of the labour’s ability to 
influence or pressurise their governments. In addition, structural adjustment 
programmes, implemented in a number of developing countries, led to the 
diminishing or even destruction of inadequate welfare programmes. The increased 
economic integration thus had effects in the political field that resulted in 
demands for democracy.61 
Overall, these three developments mean that there is a demand for 
democratisation both domestically and internationally, the latter involving both 
international intergovernmental organisations and international nongovernmental 
organisations. 
Since the 1980s a number of authoritarian regimes in the developing world 
have collapsed and many times they were replaced by democratically elected 
governments. Haynes means that although the shift to democratic rule could be a 
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result of solely domestic changes, most of the time external factors were, and still 
are, an important part of the establishment of democratic principles.62 
Democratisation requires that no foreign power hostile to this development 
interfere in the political life of a country with the intention of subverting the 
political system. This is something Robert Dahl also perceives as an important 
condition for a democratisation. As one of the unfavourable conditions in which 
democracy is less likely to thrive Dahl mention foreign control. Dahl agrees with 
Haynes that democracy is not only a result of domestic factors. It is concluded 
that powerful countries often have the capability to direct the development in the 
direction they wish. However, this foreign control is not necessarily a purely bad 
thing. The influence from a foreign power, especially if it is democratic, may 
result in the creation of democratic institutions, although it is maintained that 
there are no guarantees for democracy as a result of a foreign democratic power 
exercising its control over the political life in a country.63 
Samuel Huntington, in his The third wave, suggests that external actors can 
possibly hasten or retard democratic outcomes, though not fundamentally change 
them. He also points to the fact that encouragement to democratise may actually 
hinder overall chances for consolidation since it could lead to the process of 
democratisation before the country is ready.64 
Sell and Schmitz identify three modes of influence in understanding the 
globalisation of democracy. These three modes also correlate with competing 
theoretical concepts. The first one, the neo-realist approach sees the globalisation 
of democratisation as an issue of pressure as a result of international economic 
and geo-political conditions. In their view countries have little choice but to adapt. 
On the other hand, there is the neo-institutionalist approach that believes in 
voluntary adaptation to international standards. A final mode of influence comes 
from the constructivist perspective, where norms, values and ideas are viewed to 
have an independent influence on how actors use the international arena to affect 
domestic change.65 Although these are competing perspectives it is likely that they 
co-exist and interact. In fact, a merge of these theoretical standpoints can be found 
in Whitehead’s approach to the impact of international factors on democratisation 
which he divides into three different processes called contagion, control and 
consent. Contagion stands for the process where democracy is spread in waves 
from neighbouring countries, control refers to the process where democracy is 
imposed on a country, whereas consent suggests the incorporation of democratic 
norms, often from the outside, by actors in the state in transition.66  
As mentioned above Haynes claims that all developing countries and their 
political arrangements are affected by political globalisation i.e. by what 
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international and transnational actors do. The impact of political globalisation, 
however, varies from country to country. Haynes divides the external factors that 
are of importance in explaining recent shifts to democracy in developing countries 
into three sets: 
 
• Background factors 
These factors include favourable and unfavourable geostrategic circumstances, 
which involves foreign actors exercising their powers over a country. It also refers 
to circumstances such as economic depressions. It is argued that it is highly 
unlikely that developing countries would experiences democratic progress in a 
global or regional economic depression.67 However, as already mentioned, the 
background factors are of less importance than the following two sets of external 
factors, given that Haynes maintains that age, size and geographical position of 
the country is somewhat secondary to the influence of external actors.68 This is 
also confirmed by Schmitz and Sell who argue that countries recently 
democratised do not belong to a certain group of nations in social, economic or 
cultural terms. The structural background conditions differ considerably and they 
argue that there are serious doubts on the long-held convictions that 
democratisation under “structurally unfavourable conditions” is not possible.69 
This is reason why this set of factors is not included in the study. 
 
• State actors 
State actors is the term used to refers to states, mostly Western governments, that 
encourage democracy and sometimes even use political or economical 
conditionalities tied to aid donations. According to Haynes external actors in 
possession of large financial resources to encourage democracy are often 
important at the transition stage of democratisation. They are, however, less 
central in the institutionalisation and sustaining of democracy.70 State actors are 
involved in promoting democracy as well as and pressuring countries to 
democratise via intergovernmental organisations. Larry Diamond maintains that 
the governments of the leading industrialised democracies remain the most 
important promoters of democracy although they increasingly share it with a wide 
variety of nongovernmental organisations. The established democracies are 
engaged in democracy promotion through diplomatic pressure, conditioning of 
multilateral policies and also, as Haynes puts forward, through their official 
overseas development agencies.71  
 
• Non-state actors 
Finally, the non-states actors are used to refer to cross-border, non-state actors that 
are a part of the transnational civil society. These actors distinguish themselves in 
three ways; 1) they do not include governmental groups or profit-seeking private 
entities like transnational corporations; 2) they are transnational, meaning that 
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they interact across state borders and often beyond the control of governments; 
and 3) they may take on a variety of forms, everything from international 
intergovernmental organisations (INGOs) to more ad hoc organisations and 
associations formed to campaign on a certain issue. Transnational civil society is 
sometimes argued to be a third force emerging in international politics. The aim of 
such none-state actors are often based on their perception of public good and they 
are thus bound together, not by self-interests, but by shared values, which may 
vary from the belief in animal rights to the conviction that democracy is a global 
right of all people.72 
Like Haynes, Chu, Hu and Moon have a similar approach when analysing the 
international context of democratisation. When looking at the international 
context it is necessary, they argue, to distinguish, background or situational 
variables, external actors (such as international organisations, foreign 
governments and transnational nongovernmental actors) and forms and direction 
of external influence. The latter is referring to the forms of influence; coercion 
(military invasion or occupation), persuasion, covert or apparent.73 Goldmann also 
uses a similar approach, but excludes background factors. He looks at two kinds 
of internationalisations; internationalisation of decisions and internationalisation 
of society.74 The former can be measured in the extent to which a country is a 
member of intergovernmental organisations and how many international 
conventions have been signed whereas the latter, internationalisation of society, in 
its organised form first and foremost is reflected by nongovernmental 
organisations. Internationalisation of society is thus indicated by the number of 
NGOs in a country. Although this approach is slightly dated it too views the 
process as influenced by two sets of actors; state actors and non-state actors, 
which also is the focus of this study.  
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6 Method and Materials 
In this part the method is presented and discussed followed by a thorough 
presentation of materials employed. This part may be more extensive than normal. 
However, since the database will not be available for the readers, it is of much 
importance that the materials used in creating the database and how they were 
used in the analysis is presented in more detail.  
6.1 Method 
Quantitative studies within the field of political science are less common than 
qualitative ones. However, the quantitative method is a useful method in cases 
where one wants to study a phenomenon broadly. It is also a good starting point 
for further studies that could take on qualitative methods. If the quantitative study 
indicates that there indeed is a linkage between political globalisation and 
democratisation in developing countries, whether it is positive or negative, it 
would be interesting to later on study some countries more profoundly. The 
quantitative method is thus a way to establish a first correlation that eventually 
will be studied qualitatively to possibly find out why there is a correlation, as 
oppose to if there is one. 
One of the reasons why a quantitative method is applied in this case is that it is 
a topic that has not been studied much. Although there are a few previous studies 
indicating that globalisation has relevance for democratisation (see Previous 
Studies) globalisation is understood either as economic globalisation or 
globalisation encompassing economic globalisation as well as political and 
cultural globalisation. This study is only concerned with political globalisation. 
The effects of political globalisation on democratisation in developing countries 
seem to be minimally studied. Because of that, it would be a good idea to start 
with a quantitative method to establish if a correlation exists. 
Quantitative methods are applied when one wants to find common 
denominators as oppose to qualitative studies that are often used in studies of the 
particular. While the qualitative method allows the researcher to study the 
phenomenon from the inside, the quantitative method means that the researcher 
takes on the role as an observer rather than a participant. One of the greatest 
problems with quantitative studies is that variations and statistics can be 
manipulated by the researcher to fit the expected outcome. However, materials in 
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qualitative studies do not remain unaffected by the researcher and it is thus not a 
reason enough why one should not use quantitative studies.75 
This study will include 80 countries classified as developing countries, how 
these will be selected is discussed below. Jonas Johansson summarises why 
globalisation preferably is studied quantitatively rather than qualitatively 
 
[…] taking the geographical dimension of the concept of globalisation 
seriously requires studies with a broad scope – including large comparison.76 
 
Also, in this study of the impact of political globalisation, three political 
categories of developing countries are of interest; the relatively new democracies, 
countries in transition and countries in which transition has not begun.77 The 
developing countries in the study will be divided into these three main categories. 
However, three sub-categories will be added to countries in transition, as those 
countries are more differentiated between themselves than the countries in the 
other two categories. Because of that they are categorised into the sub-categories; 
“stable”, “fluctuating” and “recent move to free”. Stable means that the country 
has remained within the same category during the whole time studied (Freedom 
House ranking partly free). Countries in the category “fluctuating” are countries 
that have moved between the different Freedom House rankings, the majority 
between not free and partly free, but a few have also occasionally been ranked 
free. Finally, the category “recent move to free” indicates that the country has 
been continuously ranked as free, though not long enough to be included among 
the relatively new democracies. 
The reason for using the categories is that it allows one to study if the political 
globalisation has different impacts depending on political system or because these 
countries are less politically globalised. As a result it is also necessary to study the 
development over time. If newly democratised countries show a high level of 
political globalisation throughout the democratisation period this could possibly 
indicate that external factors may have an effect. Likewise, if newly democratised 
countries have had a very low political globalisation level throughout its political 
development, chances are political globalisation is not of great importance. 
Because Haynes claim that the external factors are explaining recent shifts to 
democracy the time period that will be studied will not go further back than 
roughly 15 years, that is the early to mid 1990s. The years selected are 1991, 
1992, 1993 and 2001, 2002 and 2003. The reason why these years have been 
selected are mainly a result of available material (see 6.2.4 on Global Civil 
Society Yearbooks) but also because analysing every year since 1991 would make 
the study too extensive. 
The statistical material for state actors will be combined with the statistical 
material for non-state actors and the Freedom House ranking, and the information 
for the individual developing countries, divided accordingly to the three political 
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categories and subcategories will be entered into a database. This database will 
then be used for the analysis of the study.  
6.2 Materials 
This study is set out to investigate the effects of political globalisation on 
democratisation in the developing world. The theory by Haynes presented above 
concludes that it is basically two sets of external factors, or rather actors, that have 
relevance for democratic outcomes in the developing world; state actors and non-
state actors. This means that materials concerning political globalisation, 
developing countries, state actors and non-state actors are necessary for this study. 
6.2.1 Globalisation Indices 
There are a few globalisations indices available, the most well-known being the 
A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalisation Index. Another is the CSGR 
Globalisation Index, however, for this study the KOF Index of Globalisation has 
been chosen.78 
The KOF Index has many advantages compared to the other two. Firstly, it 
includes 158 countries which is a considerably higher number than the 
Kearney/Foreign Policy Index. Also, unlike the Kearney/FP index it is possible to 
access not only the general globalisation index but also the particular indices that 
make up the general KOF index; the economic globalisation index, the social 
globalisation index and the political globalisation index. Not to mention that the 
Kearny/FP is almost purely an index of economic globalisation. Although the 
CSGR Globalisation Index also allows access to the individual indices, and it does 
include a political globalisation index, this only includes three variables whereas 
the KOF index includes four.79 The political globalisation index of the KOF 
Globalisation Index is a composite index consisting of four variables; 1) 
embassies in the country, 2) membership in international organisations (that is 
international intergovernmental organisations), 3) participation in U.N Security 
Council missions and 4) international treaties signed, where the first three also are 
variables in the CSGR political globalisation index. These variables are mainly a 
measurement of activity on a global level, but they do also tell us how extensive 
the political interaction with the outside world is compared to other countries, and 
in this sense it is also a measurement of political globalisation. It should not be 
forgotten that memberships in international intergovernmental organisations and 
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signing of treaties are, in a way an acceptance of the underlying values that exist 
within these organisations which demonstrates a preference for democracy.  
Returning to the CSGR Index, another reason why it was not chosen is 
because the latest accessible data is not as up to date as the KOF Index. In 
addition, the KOF Index of Globalisation includes data for every year since 1970. 
In sum, the KOF Index of Globalisation is the best index of political globalisation 
for this study. Each country in this index, depending on level of political 
globalisation, has been given a number between 1 and 100, where 100 indicates 
the highest level of political globalisation. However, this index cannot provide 
information on non-state actors, which make up an important part of the theory 
applied. It is thus only used to account for the possible influence of state actors. 
6.2.2 The Centre for the Study of Global Governance – Global Civil 
Society Yearbooks 
The second variable in the theory by Haynes is transnational non-state actors. In 
order to be able to study non-state actors in developing countries the Global Civil 
Society Yearbook from the Centre for the Study of Global Governance have been 
used. The centre was established in 1992 and is based at the London School of 
Economics. It claims that it pioneered research into globalisation and it publishes 
a Yearbook on global civil society every year, always containing a variety of 
statistical materials80 
Both Freedom House (see below) and the KOF Index of Globalisation provide 
data from the early 1970s to 2006. The GCS Yearbooks however, are more recent 
and have only been published since 2000. This means that the study is much more 
limited in time when including the variable of non-state actors. The 2002, 2003 
and 2004 editions of the GCS Yearbook provide information on number of 
international nongovernmental organisations in a country and country 
participation in INGOs (number of memberships in different INGOs) for 1991 
and 2001, 1992 and 2002, and 1993 and 2003 respectively. More recent data is 
not available since the statistical part of the yearbook has changed over time and 
the newest changes mean that there is only data available for different regions, not 
individual countries. Ideally, the countries would have been analysed within more 
consistent intervals but this is simply not possible because the materials accessible 
in the GCS Yearbooks are not the same and not available for every year it has 
been published. However, the chosen years make it possible to observe changes 
both over a shorter and longer time. Political globalisation are thus analysed both 
in clusters of three year periods and ten year periods. This should give the study a 
broader perspective than just one ten year period. Still, it is not the best situation 
for a study over time, but little can be done about the material available.  
Another slight disadvantage is that the latest available material is from 2003 
and having a more recent data would indeed benefit the study more. However, the 
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aim is to find out if there is a correlation between political globalisation and 
democratisation. If such a correlation can be observed within the period of time 
studied, it is not unreasonable to assume that the correlation still exists. If nothing 
else, the shortage of statistical material on non-state actors is very telling of how 
this particular phenomenon has been neglected for a long time.     
The statistic material from the Global Civil Society Yearbooks includes all 
kinds of INGOs and networks, which means that it is not only organisations 
focusing on promoting democracy that are included. This could be problematic as 
it is not evident how many of the non-state actors that are directly involved in 
democratic issues. On the other hand it would be wrong to assume that only 
NGOs working for democracy promoting are the ones to strive for democracy, as 
was proved in the study by Chu, Hu and Moon.81 From that point of view, it is in 
fact an advantage that the non-state actors are not limited. 
6.2.3 Freedom House – Freedom in the World Ranking 
One of the most influential indices of democracy is the Freedom in the World 
ranking that has ranked the countries in the world and their level of democracy 
every year since 1973. One could almost consider it to monopolistically dominate 
the quantitative studies of democracy; it occurs again and again in different 
studies, and the fact is that there is a lack of good alternatives to Freedom House. 
The advantage of using Freedom in the World ranking is that it is highly 
considered and accepted worldwide as a measurement of democracy. Freedom 
House provides data from 193 countries and 15 territories from 1973 to 2008 and 
they are ranked Free, Partly Free or Not Free as well as given a numerical ranking 
from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the highest level of freedom and 7 the lowest level 
of freedom. The ranking is based on the evaluation of political and civil rights.  
The evaluation of political rights include the evaluation of electoral process, 
political pluralism, participation and functioning of government, whilst the 
evaluation of civil rights include freedom of expression and belief, associational 
and organisational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual 
rights. When the combined average of political rights and civil rights is between 
1.0 and 2.5 the country is rated free. The average of 3.0 to 5.0 places a country 
among the partly free and finally, 5.5 to 7.0 categorises a country as not free.82 
The Freedom House ranking have been used in this study to determine which 
developing country belongs to which category (accounted for above); relatively 
new democracies, countries in transition, with its three sub-categories stable, 
fluctuating and recent move to free and countries in which transition has not 
begun. Here it was a great advantage to be able to access the Freedom House 
ranking over the years, which shows also small political changes. Another reason 
why Freedom House was chosen in order to select the countries was that its 
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definition of democracy correlates perfectly with the definition of this study, that 
is, Robert Dahl’s definition of democracy.83  
 
Figure 6.184 Freedom House Numerical Ranking Specified  
 
6.2.4 World Bank Country Classification and Human Development                                                                      
Index 
This study focuses on the possible impact of political globalisation on democracy 
in developing countries. It is thus necessary to select the developing countries to 
be included in some way. 
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1 
Countries receiving a rating of 1 come closest to 
ensuring the freedoms. The elected rule, there 
are competitive parties, the opposition is 
important and has actual power.  
Countries rated 1 come closest to ensuring the freedoms, 
including freedom of expression, assembly, association, 
education, and religion. They are distinguished by an 
established and generally equitable system of rule of law.  
 
2 
Countries rated 2 are less free. Such factors as 
political corruption, violence, political 
discrimination against minorities, and foreign or 
military influence on politics may be present and 
weaken the quality of freedom. 
States with a rating of 2 have deficiencies in a few aspects 
of civil liberties, but are still relatively free. 
 
3 
4
5 
The same conditions that undermine freedom in 
rating 2. Other damaging elements can include 
civil war, heavy military involvement in politics, 
unfair elections, and one-party dominance. 
States may still enjoy some elements of political 
rights, including the freedom to organise quasi-
political groups, reasonably free referendums, or 
other means of popular influence on 
government. 
Countries rated of 3, 4, or 5 range from those that are in at 
least partial compliance with the standards to those with a 
combination of scores The level of oppression increases at 
each successive rating level, including in the areas of 
censorship, political terror, and the prevention of free 
association. In many cases groups opposed to the state 
engage in political terror that undermines other freedoms. 
 
6 
Countries rated 6 have systems ruled by military 
juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious 
hierarchies, or autocrats. These regimes may 
allow only a minimal manifestation of political 
rights, such as some degree of representation or 
autonomy for minorities.  
People in countries rated 6 experience severely restricted 
rights of expression and association, and there are almost 
always political prisoners and other manifestations of 
political terror. Countries may be characterised by a few 
partial rights, such as some religious and social freedoms, 
some highly restricted private business activity, and 
relatively free private discussion. 
 
7 
In countries rated 7, political rights are absent 
or virtually nonexistent as a result of the 
extremely oppressive nature of the regime or 
severe oppression in combination with civil 
war. May also be marked by extreme violence 
or warlord rule, dominating political power in 
the absence of an authoritative, functioning 
central government. 
States with a rating of 7 have virtually no freedom. An 
overwhelming and justified fear of repression characterises 
these societies. 
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The World Bank country classification includes 185 countries and has been used 
in order to separate developing countries from other countries. Countries 
classified as middle income countries or below are considered developing 
countries by the World Bank. However, they are careful to note that 
“classification by income does not necessarily reflect development status”.85 
Because of this and as the definition is purely economic it has been complemented 
with the United Nations Development Programme’s index, the Human 
Development Index, also known as the HDI. Economic measurements of 
development are insufficient and say very little about the actual development 
situation. This is why the HDI, a composite index, measure both economic and 
social development. It consists of three different indices measuring life 
expectancy, educational attainment and income and it is said to better reflect the 
development situation in countries. The HDI includes 177 countries ranked and 
divided into three general categories; High Human Development, Medium Human 
Development and Low Human Development.86 The problem with the HDI is that 
is does not clearly state which countries are developing countries. As a result the 
World Bank Country Classification has been used as a first step to choose the 
countries that will be included in this study. However, they have then been 
compared to the HDI, and if any country has been found in the High Human 
Development category it has been eliminated from the study. This is because the 
HDI is better at reflecting the development status and it is thus unwise to include a 
country that is categorised as a developing country by the World Bank but placed 
in the High Development category by the UNDP. 
6.3 The Countries 
The countries in this study are all developing countries but the political situation 
in the countries varies greatly. The three main categories in which every country 
will be placed are accounted for below as well as what results would indicate 
relevance of political globalisation. 
6.3.1 Relatively New Democracies 
The relatively new democracies are the countries that have been rated as free 
countries by Freedom House for at least 7 years in a row, that is, rated free at least 
from 1996. It is generally thought that if a country has experienced two 
consecutive elections in a row democracy can said to be somewhat consolidated. 
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This is related to Huntington’s turnover test.87 This is obviously a very broad 
definition, and not sufficient in itself. However, because the definition of 
democracy, both in this study and for Freedom House, encompasses much more 
than just elections (see 3.3) it can be used as a criterion for categorising the 
countries. The seven year period has been chosen partly because it is roughly half 
of the time studied, partly because the term in which a government is in power 
may vary, although three or four years are the most common. This means that the 
chosen time period somewhat corresponds to the period in which two election 
should have been held. The countries should in other words have been categorised 
as free by Freedom House for seven consecutive years, no change of category to 
partly free being allowed. In this study this category includes 10 countries or 
12.5% of the countries, making it the smallest category in the study.  
In the statistical analysis a high level of political globalisation during the whole 
time would indicate that political globalisation could be significant. Likewise, low 
level of political globalisation during the whole period would indicate the 
opposite, that it might not be of any importance. Preferably, the level of 
globalisation should also be higher for this category than the level for the 
countries in the other categories.   
6.3.2 Countries in Transition 
Countries in this category are the ones that have begun a transition towards a more 
democratic rule. These are the countries that show a relative improvement over 
the years, that is, they have gone from not free to partly free, or even recently 
from partly free to free, although they remain too new to be classified as relatively 
new democracies. Although some countries have remained classified as partly 
free throughout the studied time period, and thus do not show any sign of change 
during 12 years, the countries have still begun a transition as they do in fact 
provide some civil and political rights to the people. Democratisation is not one 
smooth, linear process but includes setbacks and rise of new problems. It also 
takes time. It would thus be problematic to categorise a country as a country that 
has not begun transition only because it has not shown any development during 
the twelve years studied. This category is the biggest in the study with 62.5 % of 
the countries, that is, 50 countries in total.  
For this category high level of political globalisation would also signify that it 
could have importance for democratisation. Here it is also possible to see if the 
countries that have fluctuated more between different Freedom House 
categorisations or the ones that in fact have been ranked as free recently are more 
politically globalised than the ones that have stayed within the same category 
between 1991 and 2003. Because of the shifting nature of the countries in this 
category, they have, as mentioned, been divided into three sub-categories; stable, 
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fluctuating and countries that have recently moved to the category free, although 
not long enough for them to be placed in the relatively new democracy- category. 
The number of countries that have been fluctuating between categories is 21, 21 
have also been stable, while 8 had recently been categorised as free. Among the 
ones that were changing categories 6 countries were at least once ranked as free. 
The remaining 16 fluctuated between not free and partly free.  
6.3.3 Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun 
The final category is the one that includes countries that have not begun any 
transition towards democratic rule. These countries are the ones that have 
remained within the same Freedom House category of not free during the whole 
time period (1991-2003). Although the argument above could be applied here as 
well; democratisation takes time and there are always the possibility for setbacks, 
it turned out that the majority of the countries in this category have been 
categorised as not free, not only during the twelve years included here but during 
the whole time Freedom House has carried out its ranking, which started in 1973. 
The remaining countries that in fact changed ranking outside the time period 
between 1991 and 2003 only did so for a very short time, often not more than a 
year in a row, which could be a result of elections held. The number of countries 
classified as not to have begun a transition is 20 which is 25 % of the 80 countries 
in the study.   
For this category to confirm that political globalisation has an effect on 
democratisation it should show low levels of political globalisation throughout the 
time period. This might be the most interesting category seeing that if it turns out 
that the political globalisation is about the same as in the countries in the other 
categories, it would indicate that political globalisation is of minor importance.  
 
Figure 6.2 Countries in the Study Divided Into Categories 
 
Transition Not 
Begun Transition Begun Transition Begun Transition Begun 
Relatively New 
Democracies 
  Stable Fluctuating Recent Move to Free   
Algeria Armenia Azerbaijan El Salvador Belize 
Angola Bangladesh Bolivia Ghana Benin 
Burundi Burkina Faso Congo Rep. India Botswana 
Cambodia Central African Rep. Côte D'Ivoire Lesotho Guyana 
Cameroon Colombia Dominican Rep. Peru Jamaica 
Chad Ethiopia Gambia Senegal Mali 
China Gabon Haiti Suriname Mongolia 
Congo Dem. Rep. Georgia Honduras Thailand Namibia 
Egypt Guatemala Indonesia   Philippines 
Iran Guinea-Bissau Kenya   South Africa 
Mauritania Jordan Kyrgyz Rep.     
Myanmar Madagascar Malawi     
Rwanda Moldova Niger     
Sudan Morocco Nigeria     
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Swaziland Mozambique Pakistan     
Syria Nepal Papua New Guinea     
Tajikistan Nicaragua Sierra Leone     
Togo Paraguay Tanzania     
Tunisia Sri Lanka Yemen     
Vietnam Uganda Zambia     
  Ukraine Zimbabwe     
          
 
6.4 The Database and SPSS 
The statistical material for this quantitative study has been accounted for above. 
The statistic data have been entered into a database in SPSS, and then analysed. 
The material from the GCS Yearbook, used to analyse the non-state actor part of 
the theory, consisted of numbers of international nongovernmental organisations 
in a country and country participation in INGOs (number of memberships in 
different INGOs). In order to analyse the state actor part the KOF Index of 
Globalisation was used, where each country was given a number between 1 and 
100, depending on level of political globalisation. Each variable of this statistical 
material has been entered into the database for every individual country and year. 
The 80 countries was also, on the basis if the Freedom House ranking, labelled 
relatively new democracy, country where transition has not begun and country in 
transition, the latter also divided into its three sub-categories. 
Scattergrams, bivariate correlations, means comparisons and regressions are 
the main techniques used in SPSS for this study. In addition, tables have been 
created on the basis of frequency charts in SPSS and average scores for the state 
component of political globalisation have been calculated. The different 
significance tests, Pearson’s r, Eta² and ANOVA are presented below (7) as they 
are introduced to the reader.  
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7 Result and Analysis 
In this chapter the outcome of the statistical analysis of the correlation between 
political globalisation and democratisation will be presented. The result will be 
accounted for and analysed according to the factors in the theory; state actors and 
non-state actors, which then are combined into a final part. This is followed by a 
summary of the result and a conclusion, which will be elaborated in the part that 
follows. 
7.1 State Actors 
As the statistical result of the analysis is presented below it could be useful to 
shortly summarise the results for each category, which would indicate a relevance 
of political globalisation for level of democracy. 
For the Relatively New Democracies-category high level of political 
globalisation during the time studied, 1991-2003, would indicate that political 
globalisation could be significant. Low level of political globalisation would 
indicate the opposite; that it might not be of any importance. The same conclusion 
can be drawn if the level of political globalisation also is about the same as for the 
other categories. 
For the category of countries in transition high level of political globalisation 
would also signify that it could have importance for democratisation. Preferably 
the level should be higher for the countries recently ranked free than for the other 
categories. Overall, the countries should however, if there is a correlation between 
political globalisation (from a state actor perspective), not have as high scores as 
the relatively new democracies.  
Finally, for the category Countries Where Transition Has No Begun to 
confirm that there is a link between political globalisation and democratisation it 
should show low levels of political globalisation throughout the time period. If 
political globalisation is about the same as among the countries in the other 
categories, the relevance of political globalisation can be questioned. 
The level of political globalisation from state actor perspective is analysed 
with the KOF Index of Globalisation. The individual years have been combined 
into indices over the 1990s (years 1991, 1992 and 1993) and the 2000s (years 
2001, 2002 and 2003), as well as one index including all years in the study. Since 
the highest level of political globalisation in the KOF Index is 100 for every year 
this means that the absolute highest number of political globalisation that can be 
reached in the index including all six years is 600 and 300 for the two indices 
including the three years for each decade.  
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Starting with the statistical analysis on the level of political globalisation within 
the categories, the ten relatively new democracies show a disperse level of 
political globalisation. In the 1990s the numbers range from 91.14 to 198.70, in 
the 2000s, from 117.73 to 245.52.88 The country with highest average level of 
political globalisation in this category, all years included, had roughly twice the 
score as the country with the lowest level. The same is true for the countries 
where transition has begun. There is a huge dispersion within all three sub-
categories both for the years in the 1990s and the 2000. The highest average score 
for the stable countries in the 1990s is seven times higher than the lowest. Within 
the same time period, this is also true for the countries where transition has not 
begun; the lowest average per year for the 1990s is 12.50, the highest is 87.69.89  
The table below accounts for the political globalisation scores in the 1990s 
and 2000s according to political category. 
 
Table 7.1  Political Globalisation Score (State Actor)  for the 1990s and 2000s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen, there has been an overall increase of political globalisation for all 
categories. While the countries where transition has not begun have the lowest 
score in the 2000s and the second lowest, after stable countries in transition, in the 
1990s, they also, oddly enough, have the highest scores for both decades. The 
highest score for the relatively new democracies are in fact the lowest among all 
categories. There is thus no consistency in the range in scores of political 
globalisation from a state actor perspective and level of democratisation.  
If one instead looks at the average score for all years, the average for all 
relatively new democracies for all years in the study is 50.55. For the countries in 
transition that have remained stable, the average for all years is 52.12, for the ones 
fluctuating the average score is 55.83 and for the ones recently ranked free it is 
65.25. Finally, for the countries where transition has not begun the average score 
for all years is 50.55.90 This means that the average score for all years is exactly 
the same for relatively new democracies as for countries where transition has not 
begun. The highest average score is found among the countries in transition 
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Category Range in Score 1990s and 2000s 
Relatively New Democracies 
1990s: 91.14 -198.70  
2000s: 117.73 - 245.52 
Country in Transition - Stable 
1990s: 34.67- 232.67  
2000s: 106.95 - 259 - 54 
Country in Transition - Fluctuating 
1990s: 53.33 - 243.48  
2000s: 120-24 - 267.92 
Country in Transition - Free 
1990s: 91.37 - 246.56  
2000s: 107,14 - 269.07 
Country Where Transition Has Not 
Begun 
1990s: 37.49 - 263.06  
2000s: 94.40 - 274.99 
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recently ranked free. Again, there seems to be no consistency in the level of 
political globalisation and level of democratisation. This is also confirmed when 
looking at the average score for all countries for the 1990s and the 2000s.  
 
 Table 7.2 Average Political Globalisation Score (State Actor) for the 1990s and 2000s  
Category Average Score 1990s and 2000s 
Relatively New Democracies 
1990s: 42.54  
2000s: 59.20 
Country in Transition - Stable 
1990s: 44.86  
2000s: 59.38  
Country in Transition - Fluctuating 
1990s: 48.51   
2000s: 63.15 
Country in Transition - Free 
1990s: 60.08   
2000s: 70.41 
Country Where Transition Has Not 
Begun 
1990s: 46.71   
2000s: 53.94 
 
  
When running a means test it is confirmed that there is no correlation between 
political globalisation from a state actor perspective and democratisation.91 The 
measure of association, Eta², tells us how much the variation in the y-variable is 
explained by the x-variable. Eta² is between 0 and 1, where 0 is no correlation and 
1 perfect correlation. The Eta², when testing the correlation between political 
globalisation by state actor component and level of democracy, is merely 0.067, 
thus very far from 1.92 
Hence, the conclusion that can be drawn from this is that there in this part is 
no significant correlation between level of political globalisation and level of 
democracy. The variation of the level of political globalisation from a state actor 
perspective is very high for all categories. This has been shown both when 
comparing range in score and average score. The eta² square test also came out 
negative, confirming the lack of correlation since it showed virtually no 
correlation at all.  
7.2 Non-State Actors 
The non-state perspective of the theory is analysed with the statistics from the 
Global Civil Society Yearbooks, on the number of INGO secretariats in the 
countries as well as the number of different INGO memberships held by the 
people. Unlike the state actor perspective, concentrating on official global state 
activities, this part focuses on the level of political globalisation of the civil 
society.  
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Again the numbers are combined for the years in the 1990s and the 2000s, which 
then are combined for the total number for all years. The number of INGO 
secretariats and memberships are first analysed separately, then combined. It is 
also analysed if the two variables are affecting each other, that is, if a country with 
high number of INGO secretariats also indicates a high number of INGO 
memberships held by the people.  
Cross tabulations are not recommended when dealing with x-variables and y-
variables that are both quantitative, with many values and the chi² tests are not 
usable when more than 20% of the cells have frequencies with less than five, 
which often is the case with this study. This is why scattergrams have been used 
instead as the correlation between two quantitative variables is best illustrated 
with scattergrams. The correlation coefficient (r), Pearson’s r, is a measure of the 
correlation that tells us about the strength of the correlation. The closer to 1 the 
stronger is the correlation.93  
The relatively new democracies show a very high level of correlation between 
number of secretariats and memberships. With all years combined, the 
scattergrams show that the number of present INGO secretariats in the relatively 
new democracies can explain 91.7% of the variation in number of memberships in 
international nongovernmental organisations.94 The explanation level for countries 
in transition that have recently been categorised as free is even higher, at 92.9%. 
Although the explanation level is lower for the remaining categories, it still 
remains high; 80.4% for countries where transition has not begun, 75.1% for 
stable countries where transition has begun, and finally, 54.7% for fluctuating 
countries in transition.95  
The Pearson’s r also confirms the correlation between number of secretariats 
and memberships for all categories.96 High level of presence of INGOs seems to 
lead to a high number of INGO memberships held by the people. 
When looking at the range in numbers of secretariats for the different 
categories (combined for all six years in the study) the dispersion, similar to the 
state actor perspective, is very high. For the relatively new democracies the 
number ranges from 6 to 622, for the countries in transition from 2 to 270 (sub-
category stable), 0 to 653 (sub-category fluctuating), and from 2 to 934 (sub-
category recent move to free). Finally, the range in number of secretariats for all 
years for the countries where transition has not begun is 0 to 375.97 There is thus 
no consistency in the occurrence of number of international nongovernmental 
organisation secretariats and the level of democratic development. As can be seen 
in table 7.3 below, when looking at the range in number of memberships in 
different INGOs, the variation is again high within the different categories, at the 
same time as the differences between them remain rather small. One can thus 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
93 Djurfeldt, Göran – Larsson, Rolf – Stjärnhagen, Ola. 2008 Statistisk verktygslåda – 
samhällsvetenskaplig oraksanalys med kvantitativa metoder. p.161-162, 229, Lund: Studentlitteratur 
94 Appendix p.60 
95 Appendix p. 61-62 
96 Appendix p. 63-65 
97 Appendix p. 65-69 
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conclude that when it comes to the number of INGO secretariats and memberships 
it says very little about the level of democratic development, although those two 
variables turned out to be closely linked to one another. 
 
Table 7.3 Range in Number of INGO Secretariats and Memberships According to Category, All 
Years Combined 
 
The Eta² test on the correlation between democratic level and number of INGO 
secretariats as well as INGO memberships confirm that there are no correlations. 
This is also true when the two different variables for the non-state perspective are 
combined. There is still no correlation with level of democracy. None of the three 
Eta² tests are even above 0.1.98  Thus, the result for this part, the non-state actor 
part, is to a great extent a duplication of the state actor part. No correlations 
between level of political globalisation and level of democracy can be observed.  
7.3 State Actors and Non-State Actors Combined 
So far the results have not confirmed any correlation between political 
globalisation, whether it is from a state or non-state perspective, and level of 
democracy. Combining the two is now what is remaining. This final part will thus 
bring together the state and non-state components of political globalisation, as 
they so far only been analysed separately.  
As a first step, the correlation between the two different components of 
political globalisation, all years combined, is analysed through scattergrams. The 
explanation level is fairly high. The state actor component can explain 43.7% of 
the variation in the non-state component for the relatively new democracies and 
69.7% for the countries where transition has not begun. For countries where 
transition has begun the state actor component can explain 52.6% of the variation 
in stable countries, 79.5% in the fluctuating countries and 60.5% in the countries 
recently ranked as free. When combining all countries the state actor component 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
98 Appendix p.70-72 
Category 
Range in Number of INGO 
Secretariats 
Range in Number of INGO 
Memberships 
Relatively New Democracies 
 
6 – 622 
 
1746 – 13133 
 
Country in Transition – Stable 
 
2 – 270 
 
1184 – 10272 
 
Country in Transition - 
Fluctuating 
0 – 653 
 
868 – 9573 
 
Country in Transition – Free 
 
2 – 934 
 
1876 – 16055 
 
Country Where Transition Has 
Not Begun 
0 – 375 
 
626 – 12704 
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can explain 59.3% of the variation in the non-state actor component as can be 
seen in the figure below. This means that there is at least a co-variation between 
the two components which constitutes political globalisation both within the 
categories and between them.99   
 
Figure 7.1 Scattergram on State Actor and Non-State Actor Component of Political Globalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The result is the same when running scattergrams for the 1990s and the 2000s. 
The co-variation is slightly higher in the 1990s than for all years combined; 59.7% 
and lower for the 2000s alone; 55.1%. The Pearson’s r tests confirm that there is a 
correlation. For all countries and all years combined the Pearson’s r for the 
correlation between the state actor component and the non-state component is 
0.770 which is significant and it remains significant also when Pearson’s r is 
tested for all categories all years combined and for all countries in the 1990s and 
in the 2000s respectively.100  
When combining the two components of political globalisation and running a 
means test with democratic category as independent variable the Eta² test is only 
0.087, which is very low and the correlation is more or less nonexistent. A 
regression with democratisation level as dependent on political globalisation level 
shows no correlation. The ANOVA test is 0.113, while the level of significance is 
0.05 or below. The result is the same for a regression with political globalisation 
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as dependent on level of democracy. Regressions for both the 1990s and the 2000s 
produce the same result. The ANOVA tests are far higher than the significance 
level with 0.103 for the 1990s and 0.115 for the 2000s. Finally, compare means 
tests are run for both decades, which show no sign of significance with the Eta² 
being 0.101 for the 1990s and 0.063 for the 2000s.101  
In sum, while it has been confirmed that the two components of Haynes’s 
theory, state actor and non-state actor are correlated, the level of political 
globalisation can not be explained by the level of democracy and nor can the level 
of democracy be explained by the level of political globalisation.  
  
7.4 Discussion on Outcome  
The question to be answered in this study was if a correlation between political 
globalisation and democratisation in developing countries could be observed. The 
statistical analysis above has shown unambiguous results that point to the fact that 
level of political globalisation and level of democracy have very little to do with 
each other. A correlation can not be observed. However, results that show no 
correlation are also of interest. It is not only a positive result that tells us 
something about the correlation between democratisation and political 
globalisation.  
The study by Jonas Johansson confirmed that there was a correlation between 
globalisation and level of democracy, when including factors of economic 
globalisation. This study has shown that there is not any correlation between 
political globalisation alone and level of democracy. This is interesting as it 
indicates that there is something about economic globalisation that in fact is 
linked to level of democracy (or just as plausible, something about the level of 
democracy that is linked to the level of economic globalisation). As discussed, 
political globalisation does not require the same preconditions as economic 
globalisation; regardless of level of development a country can engage in global 
political activities. This may be the explanation to why there seemingly is no 
correlation between political globalisation and level of democracy, yet a 
correlation when a few economic variables are added. The ideational victory of 
democracy in organisation, both governmental and non-governmental, seems to 
have had little impact on the real political situation. What happens on global level 
appears to stay on global level. That is, high engagement and interaction in 
political activities on a global level does not have any significant effects on 
democratisation in a domestic sphere. The other way around is also true; level of 
democracy does not seem to dictate the possibility for a country to interact 
globally through organisations and other arrangements, which also may be an 
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explanation to why there is not a correlation. The countries simply do not need to 
have a high level of democracy in order to take part. This is true both for the state 
and non-state actor components. The presence of international nongovernmental 
organisations and number of memberships, as a measure of a dynamic civil 
society, could be expected to be lower in developing countries with less 
developed democratic institutions. That is however not what the outcome of this 
study shows. The civil society seems to be little affected by the democratic 
situation in developing countries; at least it is as active, if measured by those two 
components, in countries where transition has not begun as in countries that are 
considered democracies.  
Another outcome of interest is the fact that a correlation between the state and 
the non-state component of political globalisation can be observed, Although it is 
not possible to further investigate what this correlation consists of in this study it 
indicates that activities in civil society (measured by number on INGO 
memberships and secretariats) are correlated with activities on global 
intergovernmental level. Since the level of democracy has already been ruled out, 
this must depend on something else.  
A correlation between the two components of political globalisation from a 
non-state actor perspective was also observed. This correlation indicates that a 
higher presence of international nongovernmental organisations leads to a higher 
number of different INGO memberships held by the people. A possible 
explanation to this is that the presence of NGOs could make the people more 
aware of the possibilities to organise themselves and affect their situation, which 
could lead to an increase in the number of INGO memberships.  
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8 Conclusion and Final Note 
With Haynes’s theory as an analytical framework political globalisation has been 
studied from the two different perspectives; the state actor perspective and the 
non-state actor perspective. These have been combined as well. Although 
correlations were observed between the two components constituting the non-state 
actor component and between the two components of political globalisation, the 
general outcome of the statistical analysis has shown that no correlation between 
political globalisation and democratisation in developing countries can be 
observed. One possible explanation to this is the fact that political globalisation 
does not require the same preconditions as economic globalisation. The fact is that 
regardless of level of development a country can engage in global political 
activities.  
Silander’s study on democracy promotion maintains that state actors are more 
active in democracy promoting but that there could be simultaneous bottom-up 
channel trying to promote democracy from below. The outcome of this study 
shows that the two components of political globalisation, state actor and non-state 
actor, in fact are correlated. The level of political globalisation from a state actor 
perspective has a significant correlation with the level of political globalisation 
from a non-state actor perspective. This means that the theory used as an 
analytical framework is confirmed in that sense that state and non-state actors are 
working interdependently. It is, however, not confirmed in that sense that a 
correlation is lacking between the different actors and level of democracy.  
This is also one of the most interesting outcomes in this study; the correlation 
between the state actor and non-state actor component. It indicates that high level 
of political activities on state level, in intergovernmental organisations is 
somehow connected to a higher level of activities in civil society (higher number 
of memberships in international nongovernmental organisations and higher 
presence of INGO secretariats). One can only speculate as to why these are 
correlated, as the level of democracy has already been excluded as a possible 
explanation. The correlation could be spurious but more research is needed before 
anything can be concluded on the correlation between the two.  
It should also be kept in mind that the result is much dependent on the material 
available. The Freedom House categorisation has determined the categorisation of 
the countries in this study. It is indeed possible that a different categorisation 
would lead to a different result. In addition, it is a fact that the third factor, 
background factors, in the theory by Haynes was not included in the study. More 
in-depth analysis on background could reveal something that has not been 
possible to observe in this statistical analysis. As possible future research it would 
be of interest to compare different political categorisations of countries in order to 
further investigate the linkage between political globalisation and 
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democratisation. It would also be fruitful to carry out a study which includes all 
different components of globalisation, but deals with them individually before 
combining them. As of now, the majority of studies on globalisation tend to lump 
all different components together without more thought of the importance or 
unimportance of them.  
Although it could be argued that a smaller sample with more thorough 
analyses would have been more productive, the size of the sample in this study 
has also been an advantage. The more deviant cases are less likely to distort the 
result and the fact that almost all developing countries in the world could be 
included gives the study the advantage of being able to generalise on the basis of 
the results. Another thing to keep in mind is that the analysis has been carried out 
on an aggregated level, which means that different international nongovernmental 
organisations for example have been grouped together. Although the study by Chu 
et al showed that NGOs without overt democracy promoting aims can and do 
have relevance for the promoting of democracy, it is still reasonable to assume 
that organisations mainly concerned with topics such as HIV/AIDS or 
environmental protection have less significance than organisation working for 
democracy. It would thus be of interest to further study the impact of different 
international nongovernmental organisations and to produce more material on 
non-state actors in general, as the material available now is rather limited.  
Furthermore a correlation between number of INGO memberships and number 
of INGO secretariats present could be observed. A given possible explanation is 
that the presence of NGOs could make the people more aware of the possibilities 
to organise themselves and affect their situation. This is however only 
speculations and further studies could investigate this linkage better. 
The theory by Haynes assumed that state actors are involved in promoting 
democracy as well as and pressuring countries to democratise via 
intergovernmental organisations. However, this seems to have had little effect on 
the countries partaking in political activities in intergovernmental organisations. 
Assumingly the pressure for democratisation would increase the more involved a 
country is which assumingly would lead to higher level of democracy, but this is 
not something that can be seen in this study. In fact, a few of the countries were 
transition has not begun are the ones to have the highest level of political 
globalisation both from a state and non-state perspective. From this point of view 
the ideational victory of democracy might not be much more than just an 
ideational victory. The overall preference for democracy within different 
intergovernmental organisations does not seem to have had a major influence on 
the developing countries considered non-democratic. This also means that Haynes 
might have overrated the influence exercised by democracy promoting countries 
and organisations from a political perspective.   
In conclusion, much has happened since the fall of the Berlin wall twenty 
years ago and Fukuyama’s statement that the end of history had come. It might be 
true what Jimmy Carter claims; that if you are totally illiterate and living on one 
dollar a day, the benefits of globalisation never come to you. However, from a 
political globalisation perspective it seems like globalisation has little to do with 
the level of democracy. In the end, the world has changed significantly and much 
  49 
remains before one can fully understand the processes and their impact on the 
world that now take place beyond the end of history.  
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9 Executive Summary 
The starting point of this study was the statement by Francis Fukuyama that 
democracy and capitalism had prevailed with the fall of the Berlin wall en the end 
of the Cold War. Although democracy won an ideational victory, the assumption 
has been proven wrong as there are many countries in today’s world that cannot 
be considered democratic. These non-democratic countries are mostly found in 
the developing world. At the same time, major changes have taken place during 
the past twenty years that followed the fall of the Berlin wall. The processes of 
globalisation and their effects have become more and more in the centre of 
attention. The aim of this thesis was to put these two phenomena; globalisation 
and democratisation, together in order to study how they might affect each other 
and to put focus on political globalisation, which too often been neglected for 
economic globalisation. A few previous studies have shown that there is a link 
between globalisation and democratisation. Jonas Johansson confirmed in his 
study that high level of globalisation combined with high level of development 
often occurred in countries with high level of democracy. However, his study 
combined both economic and political globalisation and could thus not draw any 
conclusion on which of the factors that were the most important. This is one of the 
reasons why globalisation has not been study in its whole. Since globalisation 
includes political, economic and cultural processes it is very difficult to know 
which processes have significance for democratisation if they are not first studied 
on their own. This is also linked to the fact that the different processes of 
globalisation require different preconditions. For countries to be highly 
economically globalised, openness, high level of transparency, low level of 
corruption and protected ownership rights are often required. However, this is 
something that comes with higher level of democracy and socio-economic 
development. Political globalisation does not require this. Level of development 
does not dictate the possibilities for countries to be politically globalised.  
The theory of Jeffrey Haynes was used as an analytical framework. The theory 
was divided into three sets of factors and actors considered important for political 
globalisation; state actors, non-state actors and background factors. This study did 
not deal with the latter, as Haynes himself and other previous studies reinforced 
the fact that countries recently democratised do not belong to a certain group of 
nations in social, economic or cultural terms and that the structural background 
conditions differ considerably.  
State actors referred to the pressure from other countries and organisations on 
non-democratic countries to develop, which often occur via intergovernmental 
organisations. Non-state actors referred to nongovernmental organisations part of 
the transnational civil society which were thought to work for democracy through 
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a different channel than state actors. Together the two components made up 
political globalisation in this study.  
A quantitative method was applied in this study, which was motivated by the 
fact that this study was set to establish if there is a correlation between level of 
political globalisation and level of democracy. A qualitative method would have 
been more of use if the study was to find why there is a correlation.  
The statistical analysis of the level of democracy and level of political 
globalisation required a fair amount of material. In order to select the countries 
qualifying as developing countries both the World Bank Country Classification 
and the Human Development Index were used. If the countries categorised as 
developing countries by the World Bank but ranked as having high human 
development they were excluded. In the end 80 developing countries could be 
included in the study. Nine countries were excluded as a result of a lack of 
material, 14 as they were micro-island states.  
The countries were then categorised, with the usage of the Freedom House 
ranking, in three political main categories for the analysis; relatively new 
democracies, countries where transition has begun and countries were transition 
has not begun. The countries in the second category were also divided into sub-
categories due to variation of political nature. These sub-categories were “stable”, 
“fluctuating” and “recent move to free”. Stable meaning that a country has not 
changed Freedom House ranking during the years included in the study, 
fluctuating meaning that the country has been moving between different Freedom 
House rankings and finally, recent move to free meaning that the country been 
ranked free consecutively but not long enough to be considered a democracy.  
The years included in the study were 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2002 and 2003. 
The reasons why these years have been chosen are due to the material available. 
Unfortunately, there were not more, nor more recent data available.  
The material used for the state actor component of political globalisation was 
taken from the KOF Index of Globalisation which ranked the countries from 1 to 
100 depending on level of political globalisation. Because the materials making 
up the index were only dealing with state activities on a global level, other 
material was necessary for the non-state actor component. This was taken from 
the Global Civil Society Yearbooks, which in three editions included statistics 
over number of international nongovernmental secretariats in countries as well as 
number of different international nongovernmental memberships held by the 
people. This data for both the state actor and non-state actor were then entered 
into a database in SPSS for every individual year and country together with the 
political categorisations of the countries.  
The statistical analysis was divided into three parts. The two different 
components of political globalisation were analysed on their own before they 
were brought together as one, as political globalisation in its whole.  
The analysis of the state actor component showed no correlation between 
political globalisation and level of democracy and there were major variation in 
political globalisation within the different categories. The result was duplicated in 
the part analysing the non-state actor component. No correlation could be 
observed and again major differences were seen within the categories, while they 
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remained rather small between them. A correlation between number of INGO 
secretariats and number of INGO memberships could however be observed in the 
part on non-state actor component of political globalisation. It seems like the 
presence of international nongovernmental organisation secretariats affects the 
number of memberships. That it, higher number of secretariats means higher 
number of memberships. 
In the final part, where the two components where brought together another 
correlation could be observed. The state actor component was correlated with the 
non-state actor component. This was true for also within every category and sub-
category. However, it was confirmed that level of political globalisation and level 
of democracy were not correlated. This result was the same in all three parts of the 
analysis and the significance showed that any possible correlation was practically 
non-existent. The conclusion is thus that there is not a correlation between 
political globalisation and level of democracy and that political globalisation does 
not affect democratisation.  
One possible explanation this has already been brought up; the fact that political 
globalisation does not require the same preconditions as economic globalisation. 
The fact is that regardless of level of development a country can engage in global 
political activities.  
This result has led to the suggestions that future research within this topic 
should aim to determine the impact of different international nongovernmental 
organisations as well as to produce more material on non-state actors, as the 
material available now is rather limited. Furthermore, in-depth analysis on 
background could reveal something that has not been possible to observe in this 
study as it only included state and non-state actors. It would also be of interest to 
compare different political categorisations of countries in order to further 
investigate the linkage between political globalisation and democratisation. It 
would also be fruitful to carry out a study which includes all different components 
of globalisation, but deals with them individually before combining them. As of 
now, the majority of studies on globalisation tend to lump all different 
components together. Finally, more research on the correlation between the state 
and non-state component of political globalisation is suggested as this result is 
very interesting, but cannot be further developed in the study.  
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Appendix 
7.1 State Actors 
 
Combined KOF Index of Globlisation Score for the 1990s and the 2000s for Relatively New 
Democracies 
 
 
Combined KOF Index of Globlisation Score for the 1990s and the 2000s for Countries in 
Transition, Sub-Category Stable  
Political 
Globalisation 
Score 1990s Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
91,14 Belize 30,38 
94,22 South Africa 31,41 
100,60 Mongolia 33,53 
106,54 Namibia 35,51 
114,14 Botswana 38,05 
114,73 Benin 38,24 
148,17 Mali 49,39 
152,38 Jamaica 50,79 
155,57 Guyana 51,86 
198,70 Philippines 66,23 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score 2000s Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
117,73 Botswana 39,24 
120,77 Belize 40,26 
138,43 Guyana 46,14 
155,64 Jamaica 51,88 
159,75 Mongolia 53,25 
175,32 Namibia 58,44 
203,52 Benin 67,84 
215,64 Mali 71,88 
243,78 Philippines 81,26 
245,52 South Africa 81,84 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score 1990s Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
34,67 Moldova 11,56 
37,53 Armenia 12,51 
37,78 Georgia 12,60 
97,93 Gabon 32,64 
106,24 Mozambique 35,41 
108,39 Burkina Faso 36,13 
115,44 Central African Rep 38,48 
116,85 Ukraine 38,95 
120,17 Madagascar 40,07 
126,16 Sri Lanka 42,05 
127,34 Uganda 42,45 
135,49 Paraguay 45,16 
148,74 Ethiopia 49,58 
157,54 Nicaragua 52,51 
159,06 Nepal 53,02 
164,86 Guinea-Bissau 54,95 
178,78 Guatemala 59,59 
183,77 Bangladesh 61,26 
215,75 Colombia 71,92 
220,86 Jordan 73,62 
232,67 Morocco 77,56 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score 2000s Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
106,95 Moldova 35,65 
112,93 Armenia 37,64 
113,61 Georgia 37,87 
126,12 Central African Rep 42,04 
134,16 Madagascar 44,72 
145,49 Guinea-Bissau 48,50 
149,21 Uganda 49,74 
152,64 Gabon 50,88 
169,89 Nicaragua 56,63 
176,65 Guatemala 58,83 
189,31 Ethiopia 63,10 
189,74 Mozambique 63,25 
191,28 Colombia 63,76 
195,43 Nepal 65,14 
201,89 Burkina Faso 67,30 
205,92 Sri Lanka 68,64 
214,10 Paraguay 71,36 
219,86 Bangladesh 73,29 
236,03 Ukraine 78,68 
250,43 Jordan 83,48 
259,54 Morocco 86,51 
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Combined KOF Index of Globlisation Score for the 1990s and the 2000s for Countries in 
Transition, Sub-Category Fluctuating 
 
 
 
 
Combined KOF Index of Globlisation Score for the 1990s and the 2000s for Countries in 
Transition, Sub-Category Recent Move To Free 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score 1990s Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
53.33 Kyrgyz Rep 17.78 
62.43 Azerbaijan 20.81 
97.93 Gambia 32.64 
99.13 Yemen 33.04 
100.53 Papua New Guinea 33.51 
102.21 Malawi 34.07 
102.73 Tanzania 34.24 
124.68 Haiti 41.56 
126.16 Sierra Leone 42.05 
135.40 Niger 45.13 
140.17 Côte D'Ivoire 46.72 
142.11 Dominican Rep 47.37 
145.43 Bolivia 48.48 
166.55 Honduras 55.52 
167.18 Congo Rep 55.73 
180.66 Zambia 60.22 
186.33 Zimbabwe 62.11 
220.47 Kenya 73.49 
222.49 Indonesia 74.16 
236.96 Pakistan 78.99 
243.48 Nigeria 81.16 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score 2000s Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
120.24 Congo Rep 40.08 
129.36 Papua New Guinea 43.12 
129.90 Sierra Leone 43.30 
132.52 Haiti 44.17 
137.57 Yemen 45.86 
144.82 Azerbaijan 48.27 
166.51 Tanzania 55.50 
174.08 Malawi 58.03 
175.43 Dominican Rep 58.48 
178.08 Kyrgyz Rep 59.36 
188.08 Gambia 62.69 
203.69 Niger 67.90 
206.92 Honduras 68.97 
207.68 Zimbabwe 69.25 
211.53 Côte D'Ivoire 70.51 
221.20 Bolivia 73.73 
222.25 Zambia 74.08 
246.12 Indonesia 82.04 
251.39 Kenya 83.80 
263.33 Pakistan 87.78 
267.92 Nigeria 89.31 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score 2000s Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
107.14 Suriname 35.71 
110.75 Lesotho 36.92 
214.97 El Salvador 71.66 
242.32 Thailand 80.77 
242.67 Peru 80.89 
250.55 Ghana 83.52 
252.39 Senegal 84.13 
269.07 India 89.69 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score 1990s Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
91.37 Lesotho 30.46 
94.30 Suriname 31.43 
138.52 El Salvador 46.17 
198.42 Thailand 66.14 
216.87 Peru 72.29 
225.27 Ghana 75.09 
230.64 Senegal 76.88 
246.56 India 82.19 
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Combined KOF Index of Globlisation Score for the 1990s and the 2000s for Countries Where 
Transition Has Not Begun 
 
 
 
 Combined KOF Index of Globalisation for All Years 
 
 
Relatively New Democracies                   Countries in Transition, Recent Move to Free 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score 1990s Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
37.49 Tajikistan 12.50 
63.44 Myanmar 21.15 
80.44 Cambodia 26.81 
98.38 Burundi 32.79 
99.76 Swaziland 33.25 
106.82 Chad 35.61 
108.83 Vietnam 36.28 
114.71 Rwanda 38.24 
117.63 Angola 39.21 
125.38 Mauritania 41.79 
128.99 Congo Dem. Rep 43.00 
136.29 Iran 45.43 
146.26 Togo 48.75 
148.28 Sudan 49.43 
156.07 Syria 52.02 
178.24 Cameroon 59.33 
203.51 China 67.84 
243.03 Tunisia 81.01 
246.34 Algeria 82.11 
263.06 Egypt 87.69 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score 2000s Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
94.40 Myanmar 31.47 
109.47 Swaziland 36.49 
109.97 Tajikistan 36.66 
110.42 Burundi 36.81 
113.07 Cambodia 37.69 
123.69 Chad 41.23 
125.70 Rwanda 41.90 
137.90 Angola 45.97 
138.64 Congo Dem. Rep 46.21 
142.96 Mauritania 47.65 
143.26 Vietnam 47.75 
160.45 Sudan 53.48 
162.66 Syria 54.22 
166.11 Togo 55.37 
186.62 Iran 62.21 
207.61 Cameroon 69.20 
243.36 China 81.12 
253.04 Algeria 84.35 
259.11 Tunisia 86.37 
274.99 Egypt 82.66 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score  All Years Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
201.44 Suriname 33.57 
202.12 Lesotho 33.69 
353.49 El Salvador 58.92 
440.74 Thailand 73.46 
459.54 Peru 76.59 
475.82 Ghana 79.30 
483.03 Senegal 80.51 
515.63 India 85.94 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score - All Years Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
211,91 Belize 35,32 
232,14 Botswana 38,69 
260,35 Mongolia 43,40 
281,86 Namibia 47,00 
294,00 Guyana 49,00 
303,81 Jamaica 50,64 
318,25 Benin 53,04 
339,74 South Africa 56,62 
368,02 Mali 61,34 
422,48 Philippines 70,41 
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Countries in Transition, Stable                          Countries in Transition, Fluctuating 
 
 
                                    Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score -  All 
Years Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
207,25 Azerbaijan 34,54 
229,89 Papua New Guinea 38,32 
231,41 Kyrgyz Rep 38,57 
236,70 Yemen 39,45 
256,06 Sierra Leone 42,68 
257,20 Haiti 42,87 
269,24 Tanzania 44,87 
276,29 Malawi 46,05 
286,01 Gambia 47,67 
287,42 Congo Rep 47,90 
317,54 Dominican Rep 52,92 
339,09 Niger 56,52 
351,70 Côte D'Ivoire 58,62 
366,63 Bolivia 61,11 
373,47 Honduras 62,25 
394,01 Zimbabwe 65,67 
402,91 Zambia 67,15 
468,61 Indonesia 78,10 
471,86 Kenya 78,64 
500,29 Pakistan 83,38 
511,40 Nigeria 85,23 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score -  All 
Years Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
141,62 Moldova 23,60 
150,46 Armenia 25,08 
151,39 Georgia 25,23 
241,56 Central African Rep 40,26 
250,57 Gabon 41,76 
254,33 Madagascar 42,39 
276,55 Uganda 46,09 
295,98 Mozambique 49,33 
310,28 Burkina Faso 51,71 
310,35 Guinea-Bissau 51,73 
327,43 Nicaragua 54,57 
332,08 Sri Lanka 55,35 
338,05 Ethiopia 56,34 
349,59 Paraguay 58,25 
352,88 Ukraine 58,81 
354,49 Nepal 59,08 
355,43 Guatemala 59,24 
403,63 Bangladesh 67,27 
407,03 Colombia 67,84 
471,29 Jordan 78,55 
492,21 Morocco 82,04 
Political 
Globalisation 
Score - All Years Country 
Average 
Score/Year 
147,46 Tajikistan 24,58 
157,84 Myanmar 26,31 
193,51 Cambodia 32,25 
208,80 Burundi 34,80 
209,23 Swaziland 34,87 
230,51 Chad 38,42 
240,41 Rwanda 40,07 
252,09 Vietnam 42,02 
255,53 Angola 42,59 
267,63 Congo Dem. Rep 44,61 
268,34 Mauritania 44,72 
308,73 Sudan 51,46 
312,37 Togo 52,06 
318,73 Syria 53,12 
322,91 Iran 53,82 
385,85 Cameroon 64,31 
446,87 China 74,48 
499,38 Algeria 83,23 
502,14 Tunisia 83,69 
538,05 Egypt 89,68 
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Compared Means and Eta test of significance for State Actor component of political globalisation 
and level of democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2 Non-State Actors 
 
Scattergrams on Correlations between Number of INGO secretariats and Number of INGO 
Memberships held by the people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report 
Combined KOF all years all countries 
Democratisation level Mean N Std. Deviation 
Transition not begun 303,3190 20 115,43602 
Transition begun stable 312,7238 21 94,30290 
Transition begun fluctuating 334,9990 21 94,51886 
transition begun recent move 
to free 
391,4763 8 126,14177 
Relatively new democracies 303,2560 10 63,02637 
Total 322,9116 80 101,33612 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
Combined KOF all years all 
countries * Democratisation 
level 
,259 ,067 
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Pearson’s r correlation coefficient on Number of INGO secretariats and Number of INGO 
Memberships held by the people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
  # of Sec all year 
Trans. Begun 
Stable 
# of mem.ship all 
years Trans. 
Begun Stable 
# of Sec all year Trans. Begun 
Stable 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,866** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 21 21 
# of mem.ship all years Trans. 
Begun Stable 
Pearson Correlation ,866** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
   
N 21 21 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
  
# of INGO sec 
for All year 
Relatively New 
democracies 
 # of INGO 
mem.ship All 
years 
Relatively New 
Democracies 
# of INGO sec for All year 
Relatively New 
democracies 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,958** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 10 10 
 # of INGO mem.ship All 
years Relatively New 
Democracies 
Pearson Correlation ,958** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 10 10 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations 
  # of Sec all years 
Trans Begun 
Recent Move to 
Free 
# of mem.ship all 
years Trans 
Begun Recent 
Move to Free 
# of Sec all years Trans 
Begun Recent Move to Free 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,964** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 8 8 
# of mem.ship all years Trans 
Begun Recent Move to Free 
Pearson Correlation ,964** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 8 8 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
  
# of Sec all years 
Trans. Begun 
Fluctuating 
# of mem.ship all 
years Trans. 
Begun 
Fluctuating 
# of Sec all years Trans. 
Begun Fluctuating 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,739** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 21 21 
# of mem.ship all years 
Trans. Begun Fluctuating 
Pearson Correlation ,739** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 21 21 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations 
  
# of sec all years 
Trans Not Begun 
# of mem.ship all 
years Trans Not 
Begun 
# of sec all years Trans Not 
Begun 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,896** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 20 20 
# of mem.ship all years Trans 
Not Begun 
Pearson Correlation ,896** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Number of INGO secretariats and memberships from 1990s, 2000s and All Years Combined for Relatively New 
Democracies 
Country Number of INGO secretariats Number of INGO memberships 
Belize 
1990s: 2  
2000s: 4  
All Years: 6 
1990s: 849  
2000s: 1175  
All Years: 2024 
Benin 
1990s: 31  
2000s: 62  
All Years: 93 
1990s: 1370  
2000s: 2200  
All Years: 3570 
Botswana 
1990s: 12  
2000s: 30  
All Years: 42 
1990s: 1279  
2000s: 2024   
All Years: 3303 
Guyana 
1990s: 13  
2000s: 30  
All Years: 43 
1990s: 1241  
2000s: 1484   
All Years: 2725 
Jamaica 
1990s: 51  
2000s: 51  
All Years: 102 
1990s: 2264  
2000s: 2696   
All Years: 4960 
Mali 
1990s: 18  
2000s: 21   
All Years:39 
1990s: 1285  
2000s: 1896   
All Years: 3181 
Mongolia 
1990s: 6  
2000s: 11   
All Years: 17 
1990s: 434   
2000s: 1312  
All Years: 1746 
Namibia 
1990s: 1  
2000s: 7  
All Years: 8 
1990s: 782  
2000s: 1954  
All Years: 2736 
Philippines 
1990s: 296  
2000s: 326  
All Years: 622 
1990s: 4334   
2000s: 6210  
All Years: 10544 
South Africa 
1990s: 98  
2000s: 425  
All Years: 523 
1990s: 4555  
2000s: 8578  
All Years: 13133 
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Number of INGO secretariats and memberships from 1990s, 2000s and All Years Combined for Countries in 
Transition, Sub-Category Stable 
Country Number of INGO secretariats Number of INGO memberships 
Armenia 
1990s: 0  
2000s: 3  
All Years: 3 
1990s:83  
2000s: 1609  
All Years: 1692 
Bangladesh 
1990s: 41  
2000s: 64  
All Years: 105 
1990s: 2315  
2000s: 3508  
All Years: 5823 
Burkina Faso 
1990s: 39  
2000s: 59   
All Years: 98 
1990s: 1375  
2000s: 2095  
All Years: 3470 
Central African Rep 
1990s: 9  
2000s: 0   
All Years:9 
1990s: 890  
2000s: 1199  
All Years: 2089 
Colombia 
1990s: 131  
2000s: 139  
All Years: 270 
1990s: 4251  
2000s: 6021  
All Years: 10272 
Ethiopia 
1990s: 59  
2000s: 51  
All Years: 110 
1990s: 1647  
2000s: 2320  
All Years: 3967 
Gabon 
1990s: 9  
2000s: 10  
All Years: 19 
1990s: 1128  
2000s: 1476  
All Years: 2604 
Georgia 
1990s 0:  
2000s: 10  
All Years: 10 
1990s: 125  
2000s: 1698  
All Years: 1823 
Guatemala 
1990s: 39  
2000s: 46  
All Years: 85 
1990s: 2409  
2000s: 3229  
All Years: 5638 
Guinea-Bissau 
1990s: 2  
2000s: 0  
All Years: 2 
1990s: 45  
2000s: 734  
All Years: 1184 
Jordan 
1990s: 54  
2000s: 79  
All Years: 133 
1990s:1933  
2000s: 2861  
All Years: 4794 
Madagascar 
1990s: 5  
2000s: 6  
All Years: 11 
1990s: 1617  
2000s: 2097  
All Years: 3714 
Moldova 
1990s: 0  
2000s: 5  
All Years: 5 
1990s: 61  
2000s: 1550  
All Years: 1611 
Morocco 
1990s: 49  
2000s: 52  
All Years: 101 
1990s: 3029  
2000s: 4124  
All Years: 7153 
Mozambique 
1990s: 4  
2000s: 6  
All Years: 10 
1990s: 1053  
2000s: 1895  
All Years: 2948 
Nepal 
1990s: 20  
2000s: 59  
All Years: 79 
1990s: 1428  
2000s: 2531  
All Years: 3959 
Nicaragua 
1990s: 35  
2000s: 41  
All Years: 76 
1990s: 1699  
2000s: 2365  
All Years: 4064 
Paraguay 
1990s: 18  
2000s: 16  
All Years: 34 
1990s: 2069  
2000s: 2888  
All Years: 4957 
Sri Lanka 1990s: 48  1990s :3044   
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2000s: 59  
All Years: 107 
2000s: 3999  
All Years: 7043 
Uganda 
1990s: 18  
2000s: 56  
All Years: 74 
1990s: 1926  
2000s: 3036  
All Years: 4962 
Ukraine 
1990s: 3  
2000s: 51  
All Years: 54 
1990s: 262  
2000s: 4926  
All Years: 5188 
 
 
Number of INGO secretariats and memberships from 1990s, 2000s and All Years Combined for Countries in 
Transition, Sub-Category Fluctuating 
Country Number of INGO secretariats Number of INGO memberships 
Azerbaijan 
1990s: 0  
2000s: 5  
All Years: 5 
1990s: 49  
2000s: 1236  
All Years: 1285 
Bolivia 
1990s: 7  
2000s: 33  
All Years: 40 
1990s: 2611  
2000s: 3610  
All Years: 6221 
Congo Rep 
1990s: 35  
2000s: 5  
All Years: 40 
1990s: 1295  
2000s: 1987  
All Years: 3282 
Côte D'Ivoire 
1990s: 94  
2000s: 84  
All Years: 178 
1990s: 2217  
2000s: 2986  
All Years: 5203 
Dominican Rep 
1990s: 19  
2000s: 17  
All Years: 36 
1990s: 2188  
2000s: 2856  
All Years: 5044 
Gambia 
1990s: 7  
2000s: 12  
All Years: 19 
1990s: 1090  
2000s: 1451  
All Years: 2541 
Haiti 
1990s: 5  
2000s: 0  
All Years: 5 
1990s: 1421  
2000s: 1823  
All Years: 3244 
Honduras 
1990s: 5  
2000s: 39  
All Years: 44 
1990s: 1816  
2000s: 2460  
All Years: 4276 
Indonesia 
1990s: 99  
2000s: 114  
All Years: 213 
1990s: 3828  
2000s: 5745  
All Years: 9573 
Kenya 
1990s: 311  
2000s: 342  
All Years: 653 
1990s: 3504  
2000s: 4868  
All Years: 8372 
Kyrgyz Rep 
1990s: 1  
2000s: 7  
All Years: 8 
1990s: 27  
2000s: 841  
All Years: 868 
Malawi 
1990s: 10  
2000s: 9  
All Years: 19 
1990s: 1357  
2000s: 1951  
All Years: 3308 
Niger 
1990s: 14  
2000s: 6  
All Years: 20 
1990s: 1032  
2000s: 1480  
All Years: 2512 
Nigeria 
1990s: 174  
2000s: 162  
All Years: 336 
1990s: 383  
2000s: 4927  
All Years: 8810 
Pakistan 
1990s: 84  
2000s: 82  
All Years: 166 
1990s: 3175  
2000s: 4712  
All Years: 7887 
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Papua New Guinea 
1990s: 7  
2000s: 16  
All Years: 23 
1990s: 1617  
2000s: 2102  
All Years: 3719 
Sierra Leone 
1990s: 15  
2000s: 9  
All Years: 24 
1990s: 1553  
2000s: 1838  
All Years: 3391 
Tanzania 
1990s: 42  
2000s: 53   
All Years: 95 
1990s: 2321  
2000s: 3292  
All Years: 5613 
Yemen 
1990s:0  
2000s: 0  
All Years: 0 
1990s: 707  
2000s: 1017  
All Years: 1724 
Zambia 
1990s: 34  
2000s: 31  
All Years: 65 
1990s: 2166  
2000s: 2812  
All Years: 4978 
Zimbabwe 
1990s: 72  
2000s: 118  
All Years: 190 
1990s: 2820  
2000s: 3983  
All Years: 6803 
 
 
Number of INGO secretariats and memberships from 1990s, 2000s and All Years Combined for Countries in 
Transition, Sub-Category Recent Move to Free 
Country Number of INGO secretariats Number of INGO memberships 
El Salvador 
1990s: 27  
2000s: 30  
All Years: 57 
1990s: 1805  
2000s: 2609  
All Years: 4414 
Ghana 
1990s: 85  
2000s: 109  
All Years: 194 
1990s: 2699  
2000s: 3685  
All Years: 6384 
India 
1990s: 403  
2000s: 531  
All Years: 934 
1990s: 6591  
2000s: 9464  
All Years: 16055 
Lesotho 
1990s: 10  
2000s: 9  
All Years: 19 
1990s: 1120  
2000s: 1491  
All Years: 3611 
Peru 
1990s: 160  
2000s: 145  
All Years: 305 
1990s: 3932  
2000s: 5382  
All Years: 9314 
Senegal 
1990s: 170  
2000s: 177  
All Years:347 
1990s: 2609  
2000s: 3303  
All Years: 5912 
Suriname 
1990s: 1  
2000s: 1  
All Years: 12 
1990s: 843  
2000s: 1033  
All Years: 1876 
Thailand 
1990s: 157  
2000s: 301  
All Years: 458 
1990s: 3797  
2000s: 5811  
All Years: 9608 
 
 
Number of INGO secretariats and memberships from 1990s, 2000s and All Years Combined for Countries 
Where Transition Has Not Begun 
Country Number of INGO secretariats Number of INGO memberships 
Algeria 
1990s: 37  
2000s: 32  
All Years: 69 
1990s: 2391  
2000s: 3205  
All Years: 5596 
Angola 
1990s: 3  
2000s: 6  
All Years: 9 
1990s: 912  
2000s: 1379  
All Years:2291 
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Burundi 
1990s: 0  
2000s: 2  
All Years: 2 
1990s: 987  
2000s: 1453  
All Years: 2440 
Cambodia 
1990s: 0  
2000s: 19  
All Years: 19 
1990s: 279  
2000s: 1120  
All Years: 1399 
Cameroon 
1990s: 50  
2000s: 66  
All Years: 116 
1990s: 2128  
2000s: 3194  
All Years: 5322 
Chad 
1990s: 1  
2000s: 0  
All Years: 1 
1990s: 777  
2000s: 1210  
All Years: 1987 
China 
1990s: 90  
2000s: 173  
All Years: 263 
1990s: 3737  
2000s: 8967  
All Years: 12704 
Congo Dem Rep 
1990s: 41  
2000s: 14  
All Years: 55 
1990s: 2182  
2000s: 2308  
All Years: 4490 
Egypt 
1990s: 172  
2000s: 203  
All Years: 375 
1990s: 4214  
2000s: 5948  
All Years: 10162 
Iran 
1990s: 4  
2000s: 21  
All Years: 25 
1990s: 2047  
2000s: 2913  
All Years: 4960 
Mauritania 
1990s: 6  
2000s: 7  
All Years: 13 
1990s: 869  
2000s: 1276  
All Years: 2145 
Myanmar 
1990s: 0  
2000s: 3  
All Years: 3 
1990s: 842  
2000s: 1231  
All Years:2073 
Rwanda 
1990s: 7  
2000s: 6  
All Years: 13 
1990s: 1115  
2000s: 1560  
All Years: 2675 
Sudan 
1990s: 28  
2000s: 26  
All Years: 54 
1990s: 1896  
2000s: 2228  
All Years: 4124 
Swaziland 
1990s: 9  
2000s: 6  
All Years: 15 
1990s: 1018  
2000s: 1401  
All Years: 2419 
Syria 
1990s: 58  
2000s: 30  
All Years: 88 
1990s: 1425  
2000s: 1814  
All Years: 3239 
Tajikistan 
1990s: 0  
2000s: 0  
All Years: 0 
1990s: 24  
2000s: 602  
All Years: 626 
Togo 
1990s: 24  
2000s: 58  
All Years: 82 
1990s: 1515  
2000s: 2036  
All Years: 3551 
Tunisia 
1990s: 88  
2000s: 90  
All Years: 178 
1990s: 2754  
2000s: 3732  
All Years: 6486 
Vietnam 
1990s: 2  
2000s: 11  
All Years: 13 
1990s: 1007  
2000s: 2659  
All Years: 3666 
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Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Non-State Actor component (secretariats) of 
political globalisation and Level of democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Non-State Actor component (memberships) of 
political globalisation and Level of democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               Report 
Secretariats GCS All Years 
Democratisation level Mean N Std. Deviation 
Transition not begun 69,65 20 98,647 
transition begun stable 419,14 21 1289,272 
transition begun fluctuating 103,76 21 154,263 
transition begun recent move 
to free 
290,75 8 307,213 
relatively new democracies 149,50 10 226,443 
Total 202,44 80 681,223 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
Secretariats GCS All Years * 
Democratisation level 
,211 ,045 
Report 
Membership GCS All Years 
Democratisation level Mean N Std. Deviation 
Transition not begun 4117,75 20 2946,560 
transition begun stable 3883,24 21 2463,936 
transition begun fluctuating 4697,81 21 2508,710 
transition begun recent move 
to free 
7146,75 8 4471,630 
relatively new democracies 4792,20 10 3864,817 
Total 4595,66 80 3090,512 
  71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Non-State Actor components of political 
globalisation and Level of democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Number of Secretariats and Level of democracy 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
Membership GCS All Years * 
Democratisation level 
,300 ,090 
Report 
Combined GCS All Years All Countries 
Democratisation level Mean N Std. Deviation 
Transition not begun 4187,40 20 3035,303 
transition begun stable 4302,38 21 2269,708 
transition begun fluctuating 4801,57 21 2624,811 
transition begun recent move 
to free 
7437,50 8 4767,761 
relatively new democracies 4941,70 10 4082,227 
Total 4798,10 80 3169,339 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
Combined GCS All Years All 
Countries * Democratisation 
level 
,294 ,086 
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Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Number of Memberships and Level of democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report 
Secretariats GCS All Years 
Democratisation level Mean N Std. Deviation 
Transition not begun 69,65 20 98,647 
transition begun stable 419,14 21 1289,272 
transition begun fluctuating 103,76 21 154,263 
transition begun recent move 
to free 
290,75 8 307,213 
relatively new democracies 149,50 10 226,443 
Total 202,44 80 681,223 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
Secretariats GCS All Years * 
Democratisation level 
,211 ,045 
Report 
Membership GCS All Years 
Democratisation level Mean N Std. Deviation 
Transition not begun 4117,75 20 2946,560 
transition begun stable 3883,24 21 2463,936 
transition begun fluctuating 4697,81 21 2508,710 
transition begun recent move 
to free 
7146,75 8 4471,630 
relatively new democracies 4792,20 10 3864,817 
Total 4595,66 80 3090,512 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
Membership GCS All Years * 
Democratisation level 
,300 ,090 
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7.3 State and Non-State Actors Combined 
 
 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political 
Globalisation All Years All Countries 
 
Correlations 
  Combined KOF 
all years all 
countries 
Combined GCS 
All Years All 
Countries 
Combined KOF all years all 
countries 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,770** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 80 80 
Combined GCS All Years All 
Countries 
Pearson Correlation ,770** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 80 80 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of 
Political Globalisation All Years Relatively New Democracies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  74 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political 
Globalisation All Years Relatively New Democracies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of 
Political Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Stable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
  Total Non state 
actor all years 
from Relatively 
New 
Democracies 
Combined KOF 
score for all 
years for 
Relatively New 
Democracies 
Total Non state actor all 
years from Relatively New 
Democracies 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,661* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,037 
N 10 10 
Combined KOF score for all 
years for Relatively New 
Democracies 
Pearson Correlation ,661* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,037  
N 10 10 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Pearson’s r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political 
Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Stable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of 
Political Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Fluctuating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
  Combined KOF 
score for all 
years Transition 
begun (stable) 
Total nonstate 
actor all years 
Trans Begun 
Stable 
Combined KOF score for all 
years Transition begun 
(stable) 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,726** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 21 21 
Total nonstate actor all years 
Trans Begun Stable 
Pearson Correlation ,726** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 21 21 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Pearson’s r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political 
Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Fluctuating 
Correlations 
  Combined KOF 
Score for all 
years Transition 
begun 
(fluctuating) 
Total nonstate 
actor all years 
Trans. Begun 
Fluctuating 
Combined KOF Score for all 
years Transition begun 
(fluctuating) 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,891** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 21 21 
Total nonstate actor all years 
Trans. Begun Fluctuating 
Pearson Correlation ,891** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 21 21 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of 
Political Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Recent Move to Free 
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Pearson’s r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political 
Globalisation All Years Countries in Transition; Recent Move to Free 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of 
Political Globalisation All Years Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
  Combined KOF 
score for all 
years Transition 
begun (recent 
move to free) 
Total nonstate 
actor all years 
Trans Begun 
Recent Move to 
Free 
Combined KOF score for all 
years Transition begun 
(recent move to free) 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,778* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,023 
N 8 8 
Total nonstate actor all years 
Trans Begun Recent Move to 
Free 
Pearson Correlation ,778* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,023  
N 8 8 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Pearson’s r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political 
Globalisation All Years Countries Where Transition Has Not Begun 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of 
Political Globalisation, All Countries, 1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
  Combined KOF 
SCore for all 
years Transition 
Not Begun 
Total Nonstate 
actor All Years 
Trans No Begun 
Combined KOF Score for all 
years Transition Not Begun 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,835** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 20 20 
Total Nonstate actor All 
Years Trans No Begun 
Pearson Correlation ,835** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  79 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political 
Globalisation, All Countries, 1990s 
 
Correlations 
  Combined KOF 
1990s all 
countries 
Total GCS All 
Countries 90s 
Combined KOF 1990s all 
countries 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,773** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 80 80 
Total GCS All Countries 90s Pearson Correlation ,773** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 80 80 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Scattergram on Correlations between State Actor Component and Non-State Component of 
Political Globalisation, All Countries, 2000s 
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Pearson’s r correlation coefficient on State Actor and Non State Actor Component of Political 
Globalisation, All Countries, 2000s 
Correlations 
  Combined KOF 
2000s all 
countries 
Total GCS All 
Countries 00s 
Combined KOF 2000s all 
countries 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,742** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 80 80 
Total GCS All Countries 00s Pearson Correlation ,742** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 80 80 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, 
All Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report 
State and Nonstate Actor combined All Years 
Democratisation level Mean N Std. Deviation 
Transition not begun 4490,7190 20 3132,33203 
transition begun stable 4615,1048 21 2339,03304 
transition begun fluctuating 5136,5705 21 2709,40721 
transition begun recent move 
to free 
7828,9763 8 4863,50292 
relatively new democracies 5244,9560 10 4123,66931 
Total 5121,0116 80 3248,01543 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
State and Nonstate actor 
combined * Democratisation 
level 
,294 ,087 
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Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, 
1990s 
Report 
State and Nonstate Actor Combined 1990s 
Democratisation level Mean N Std. Deviation 
Transition not begun 1777,0975 20 1171,70918 
transition begun stable 1726,5452 21 1159,43630 
transition begun fluctuating 2131,4052 21 1209,68754 
transition begun recent move 
to free 
3231,3688 8 2037,83671 
relatively new democracies 2019,7460 10 1544,69341 
Total 2032,5915 80 1367,60787 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared Means and Eta test of significance for Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, 
2000s 
 
Report 
State and Nonstate Actor Combined 2000s 
Democratisation level Mean N Std. Deviation 
Transition not begun 2713,6215 20 2041,42017 
transition begun stable 2891,1514 21 1354,25492 
transition begun fluctuating 3004,7438 21 1517,67932 
transition begun recent move 
to free 
4471,3575 8 2961,76311 
relatively new democracies 3227,2100 10 2631,06876 
Total 3076,6149 80 1964,52717 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
State and Nonstate Actor 
Combined 1990s * 
Democratisation level 
,318 ,101 
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Regressions on Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, 1990s 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4985411,891 1 4985411,891 2,724 ,103a 
Residual 1,428E8 78 1830414,601   
Total 1,478E8 79    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Democratisation level 
b. Dependent Variable: State and Nonstate Actor Combined 1990s 
 
 
Regressions on Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, 2000s 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7842210,804 1 7842210,804 2,059 ,155a 
Residual 2,970E8 78 3808304,884   
Total 3,049E8 79    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Democratisation level 
b. Dependent Variable: State and Nonstate Actor Combined 2000s 
 
 
Regressions on Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, All Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures of Association 
 Eta Eta Squared 
State and Nonstate Actor 
Combined 2000s * 
Democratisation level 
,251 ,063 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2,657E7 1 2,657E7 2,569 ,113a 
Residual 8,068E8 78 1,034E7   
Total 8,334E8 79    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Democratisation level 
b. Dependent Variable: State and nonstate actor combined 
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Regressions on Political Globalisation and Level of Democracy, All Years (Democratisation as 
Dependent Variable) 
 
 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4,316 1 4,316 2,569 ,113a 
Residual 131,071 78 1,680   
Total 135,388 79    
a. Predictors: (Constant), State and nonstate actor combined 
b. Dependent Variable: Democratisation level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
